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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When South African Minister of Foreign Affairs R. F. “Pik” Botha first met United States
President Ronald Reagan in 1981, he asserted to Reagan that South Africa could “not afford,
publicly, to surrender,” the quest for nuclear capability.1 In this meeting, Botha appealed to the
newly elected Ronald Reagan to recognize what had become a problematic international image
of South Africa. The apartheid government, isolated in many international forums, hoped that
Reagan would be willing to make a public defense of Pretoria’s nuclear program, its supposedly
gradual racial reforms, and its regional policies of aggression. As a result, the US relationship
with South Africa did not exist in a vacuum. South Africa, an international pariah for its racial
separation through the apartheid system, was a critical Cold War ally prior to Reagan’s entrance
into the White House. The white Afrikaner government proclaimed itself as a capitalist
stronghold in a region where other governments were increasingly allied with the Soviet Union.2
For this reason, public criticism from anti-apartheid activists, public figures, and African
officials against South Africa forced Reagan’s foreign policy team to publicly justify the
administration’s relationship with apartheid South Africa.
Reagan’s ascension to the Presidency in 1981 brought promises of changing the Soviet
Union-United States relationship through rollback policies in communist African states, like

1

"Notes on Meeting between South African Minister of Foreign Affairs R. F. Botha and US President Reagan,"
May 15, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, File
137/10/02 Vol. 9, doc. No. 82214/006772, obtained and contributed by Or Rabinowitz, the Wilson Center Digital
Archive.
2
The Afrikaner ethnic group descended from Dutch traders in the 18 th century who claimed themselves the rightful
settlers of South Africa. The Nationalist Party (NP), a predominantly Afrikaner political group, instituted apartheid
in the 1948 Constitution. For this reason, the apartheid South African government will frequently be referred to as
“Pretoria,” where the apartheid government capital was located, or the Botha administration, so named after P. W.
Botha the Prime Minister and then State President after the constitutional revision of 1983.
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Angola, by engaging with the South African government.3 This Reagan Doctrine shaped the
early relationship of the United States and South Africa. Anti-communist freedom fighters like
the South African Defense Force (SADF) and their support for the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) had to be supported to deter the development of communistfriendly allies in the region. Under US Presidents Ford and Carter presidencies, 11,000 Cuban
fighters stationed in Angola promoted the rise of communist liberation groups. In this light,
Reagan reinvigorated the direct attack against communism and criticized détente for its
weakening of American values abroad.
Yet, the Reagan administration would have provided further support to South Africa had
it not been for the Clark Amendment, an amendment added to the US Arms Export Control Act
of 1976 to prevent any direct or covert military intervention in Angola after President Ford and
Henry Kissinger’s proxy-war with Cuba and the Soviet Union in 1975.4 In the 1980s, Reagan
and his team revitalized their working relationship with South Africa to curb the Soviet influence
over the region. Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker
oversaw the policy of constructive engagement to promote gradual internal reform of apartheid
and regional peacebuilding with Angola and Namibia. However, rebuilding the relationship with
South Africa meant considering the public perception of the United States’ relationship with
Pretoria.
White House staffers constantly grappled public perception during Reagan’s tenure.5 The
former actor turned President carefully crafted his image to appeal to the majority of

3

John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 234.
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence, “Angola: Impact of Clark
Amendment,” April 14, 1983.; Ronald W. Walters, “The Clark Amendment: Analysis of U.S. Policy Choices in
Angola,” The Black Scholar 12, no. 4 (July 1981): 2–12.
5
The Reagan Show, directed by Sierra Pettengill and Pacho Velez (Gravitas Ventures and CNN Films, 2017),
Kanopy.
4
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conservative voters. Reagan’s team paid special attention to Reagan’s image and such concerns
informed critical policy decisions, including foreign policy.6 South Africa, similarly, knew the
stakes of having a palatable public image. Pik Botha’s explicit concern for the public when
discussing South Africa’s nuclear weapons with Ronald Reagan compels historians to consider
Reagan’s relationship with South Africa beyond the Cold War paradigm. The Reagan
administration and Pretoria individually formulated their policies toward each other based on
public perception, which translated to a relationship based on appearance, rather than on
substance.
Public discourse over foreign policy ensured a level of accountability to the US Congress
from the US President. 7 In the case of Reagan’s relationship with South Africa, criticism came
predominantly from nontraditional foreign policy influences—mostly grassroot anti-apartheid
organizations and activists—as well as from congressional members in favor of ending
apartheid. During Reagan’s first term, critics of the US-South Africa relationship started to
coordinate their message to the American public and world in public meetings and joint
declarations. By Reagan’s second term, anti-apartheid activists’ efforts against the Reagan
administration’s policies toward South Africa—especially with the Divestment Movement—
forced an institutional reevaluation of the US-South African relationship and the creation of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Grassroot organizers and public critics’ efforts shifted
Reagan’s policy focus toward regional peace negotiation after failing to internally reform South
Africa. This thesis expands the traditional analysis of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policies by

6

Laurence R. Jurdem, Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2018) and Henrik G. Bastiansen, Martin Klimke, and Rolf
Werenskjold, eds., Media and the Cold War in The 1980s: Between Star Wars and Glasnost (Cham, Switzerland:
Springer International Publishing AG, 2018).
7
Paul E. Peterson, ed., The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1994).
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including the public’s influence to create, implementation, and responsively change its South
African policies. Thus, this thesis emphasizes the power that nontraditional foreign policy actors
wield in foreign policy making.

Historiographical Context
The study of Reagan’s foreign policy is an emerging field in history given the close
proximity to the present. With the previous time restrictions on source material, much of the
interpretation of 1980s foreign policy was left to the observers and participants of the period. To
this day, Reagan is credited as the Great Communicator with domestic politics and the Soviet
Union.8 This is due, in part, to the autobiographical accounts of Reagan officials, news coverage,
and political analysts that created the initial observations which firmly placed the US-South
African relationship in the Cold War context and Reagan as the sole manipulator of media
attention and popular opinion. With more holistic interpretations of the US-South African
relationship emerging, the historiography will evolve with it. Based on current findings, this
thesis is the sole work that studies Reagan’s Southern African foreign policy and the influence of
public pressure from anti-apartheid activists in tandem.
A study on the Reagan administration’s awareness of public criticism and how the
administration conducted its South African policies in response allows for a new interpretation of
the relationship while simultaneously expanding existing literature on the public’s influence over
foreign policy. The historiography covers three different focuses regarding the US-South African
relationship: US foreign policy in the Cold War and Southern Africa, the Reagan

8

Reagan Gresham Dye, “Applause, Laughter, Chants, and Cheers: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Skill of the ‘Great
Communicator’” (master’s thesis, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, 2018).
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administration’s relationship with the public and media, and the role of critics within and outside
of the United States and South Africa.
There are two different interpretations describing the United States’ foreign policy with
Southern Africa in the 1980s. The first interpretation emphasizes that the Cold War alliance
hindered any monumental policy changes, which subsequently made Ronald Reagan’s
constructive engagement policy a minor reframing of the alliance. This framework’s longstanding support evolved from the many historians who offered niche explanations for minute
political changes. Focused on the Cold War alliance between the US and South Africa, this
historiography remains a subfield of the US foreign relations in larger international contexts. For
example, while Ben Martin’s 1989 article places the diplomacy of Southern Africa in the Cold
War theater, he frequently refers to the slow movements of Reagan officials, Chester Crocker in
particular, towards achieving any peaceful change in the region.9 Martin speaks of a history of
foreign relations built upon slow incremental changes, with examples of Reagan’s attempts to
revitalize a foreign policy that were still bogged down by a Cold War alliance. Richard
Goldstone furthers Martin’s argument by emphasizing the ambivalence of the Reagan
administration towards South Africa’s human rights violations in an attempt to shift from
President Carter’s harsher rhetoric.10 Studying Reagan’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa
in a predominately Cold War context extended beyond the South African border into
neighboring countries like Angola.
Todd Greentree’s 2016 dissertation is a testament to the longevity of this school of
thought where the traditional analysis of foreign policy is one of incremental changes. In

9

Ben L. Martin, “American Policy towards Southern Africa in the 1980s,” The Journal of Modern African Studies
27, no. 1 (1989): 45.
10
Richard Goldstone, “Ambiguity and America,” Social Research 72, no. 4 (2005): 816.
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analyzing the Angolan civil war and US involvement, Greentree describes the series of
failures—under previous administration—that informed Reagan’s own readiness to frame his
foreign policy as an anti-Communist rhetoric.11 Additionally, Chester Pach’s 2006 article
analyzes the Reagan Doctrine of aiding anti-Communist resistance groups and countries—
such as South Africa—within the context of regional stability and Cold War defense as a
pragmatic policy option.12
The second US foreign policy interpretation emphasizes regional stability as the key
motivator for US actions, regardless of significant policy shifts. While fundamental at
understanding the complexity of apartheid’s influence over the region, this interpretation often
remove the Southern African region from other international influences or the apartheid state’s
level of agency in its relationship with the United States. Early views of this position like Robert
Davies and Dan O’Meara’s 1985 article describe a destabilized Southern Africa as the result of
South African aggression. Hardly mentioning the United States at all, Davies and O’Meara both
argue that the South Africa was a rogue state separated from the rest of the world’s politics.13 In
presenting the country as an abnormality, this regional interpretation is in direct contrast to the
incrementalism school of thought as the region seemingly defies the larger forces of Cold War
politics.
More recent scholarship from Alex Thomson, Todd Greentree, and Michel Hendrix
further expand the discussions on United States-South Africa relationship by basing the
relationship solely on regional stability and ignoring South Africa’s apartheid policy on the

11

Todd Greentree, “The Origins of the Reagan Doctrine Wars in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan” (PhD
diss., University of Oxford, 2016).
12
Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no.
1 (2006): 75–88.
13
Robert Davies and Dan O’Meara, “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional
Policy Since 1978,” Journal of Southern African Studies 11, no. 2 (April 1985): 183–211.
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claims of sovereignty.14 Alex Thomson’s 1995 article revisited the policy of constructive
engagement through the lens of regional. Thomson argued that, despite the failure the United
States’ initial goal of seeking internal change in South Africa through constructive engagement,
the hastily put together regional peace accord was its saving grace.15 In his 2012 doctoral
dissertation, Michael Hendrix highlights the primacy of regional stability during the Reagan
administration. While Hendrix acknowledges Thomson’s interpretation of constructive
engagement, he claims that regional stability—especially against communism—was always the
main goal of Crocker’s constructive engagement, not the end of apartheid.16 Yet again, Hendrix
did not take into account the domestic politics in both the US and South Africa in the policy goal
and its reframing. This thesis acknowledges these regional complexities but seeks to engage a
broader context of influences over the US-South African relationship. The current United States
foreign relations historiography overlooks the intricate network of foreign policy stakeholders
and obscures the role of anti-apartheid activists in the United States and the southern African
region.
Many communications and public rhetoric scholars examine Reagan’s skills in
manipulating media attention and popular opinion, deeming him the first President to capitalize
on the emerging diversified media networks.17 Robert Mann’s biographic depicts a growing

Alex Thomson, “Incomplete Engagement: Reagan’s South Africa Policy Revisited,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 33, no. 1 (March 1995): 83–101; Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South
Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2008); Michael Patrick Hendrix, “The Hammer and the Anvil:
The Convergence of United States and South African Foreign Policies during the Reagan and Botha
Administrations” (Stellenbosch University, 2012); Todd Greentree, “The Origins of the Reagan Doctrine Wars in
Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan” (University of Oxford, 2016).
15
Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave
Macmillian, 2008).
16
Michael Patrick Hendrix, “The Hammer and the Anvil: The Convergence of United States and South African
Foreign Policies during the Reagan and Botha Administrations” (PhD diss., Stellenbosch University, 2012).
17
Reagan Gresham Dye, “Applause, Laughter, Chants, and Cheers: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Skill of the ‘Great
Communicator’” (master’s thesis, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, 2018).
14
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influence of the Republican party, and specifically the far-right, in informing Reagan’s early
views and political positions. Gil Troy’s Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the
1980s, and Laurence Jurdem’s 2018 book Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of
Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy both discuss the broader public awareness on foreign
policy.18 However, these works hardly mention the US-South Africa relationship. While Troy
explores Reagan as a singular phenomenon that transformed the 1980s, he pays little attention to
the significant role administration members had in responsively crafting Reagan’s public persona
and policies.19 Jurdem, departing from Troy’s earlier focus on Reagan, shifts his attention to the
early influences of media, particularly conservative media outlets, crafting foreign policy.20 The
two seem disconnected from each other and yet both acknowledge the critical role of the media
as a shaper of Presidential policies. For that reason, this thesis incorporates their theories on the
growing conservative influence on the Reagan administration as evidence towards the
conservative public influences on Reagan’s relationship with South Africa.
The final portion of the historiography of this thesis focuses on the role of popular
criticisms against the US and South African governments. Joanne Davies 2007’s Constructive
Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia, & Angola 1981-8
expands the scholarship with her comprehensive analysis on the criticism against constructive
engagement as the main US policy towards southern Africa. Davies argues that public criticism
of constructive engagement’s basic assumptions—namely South Africa’s own willingness to
reform—shifted the Reagan policy towards regional peace agreements such as linkage after

18

Gil Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2005); Jurdem, Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign
Policy.
19
Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s.
20
Jurdem, Paving the Way for Reagan : The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy.
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failing to eliminate apartheid.21 However, Davies’ brief analysis of nontraditional foreign policy
actors focuses on South African exiled political parties. This thesis expands Davies’ study on
political parties’ influence on policy to analyze multiple US-based anti-apartheid organizations’
criticism of the Reagan administration’s relationship with South Africa.
Another fundamental work on public criticism of US foreign policy comes from George
M. Frederickson’s 1981 book, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South
African History, where Frederickson covers the long history of African-American civil rights
activists struggle to reform policies within the United States on domestic and foreign matters.22
Frederickson’s work, though not discussing the public’s influence over the Reagan
administration, demonstrates the growing political power that anti-apartheid groups possessed in
lobbying for the end of apartheid. This thesis expands on the public interference over US foreign
relations particularly from minority communities.
Scholars Gail Gerhart and Prexy Nesbitt mirrored Fredrickson theory on linking antiapartheid activism to rising political power of minority communities and advocating for change
in US foreign policy to the larger American public.23 Similarly, William Minter, Gail Hovey, and
Charles Cobb, Jr.’s recent works describe the high level of coordination between Americans and
Black South Africans from the 1950s to the 2000s to pressure change in US foreign policy,
including Ronald Reagan’s policies with South Africa.24 Further works from Thomas
Borstelmann and Donald Culverson further Frederickson’s argument on the growing political

21

Joanne E. Davies, Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia, &
Angola 1981-8 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).
22
George M Frederickson, White Supremacy : A Comparative Study of American and South African History
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1981).
23
Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa, Perspectives on Southern Africa, No. 19 (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1978); Prexy Nesbitt, “Apartheid in Our Living Rooms: U.S. Foreign Policy and South Africa,”
Midwest Research Monograph Series 3 (Midwest Research, 1986).
24
William Minter, Gail Hovey, and Charles Cobb Jr, eds. No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American
Activists over a Half Century, 1950-2000.
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power that previously disenfranchised groups wielded against the Reagan administration.
Culverson’s argues that the efforts of the anti-apartheid movement, the House Subcommittee on
Africa, and the Congressional Black Caucus raised public consciousness on South Africa and
influenced the shifts in Congress that led to the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 and to the overriding of Reagan’s veto that enforced stricter sanctions on the
apartheid government.25 Culverson’s argument on specific public actors outside of the Reagan
foreign policy apparatus informed my initial research into Reagan foreign policy critics.
Historians Thomas Borstelmann’s The Cold War and the Color Line and Francis
Nesbitt’s Race for Sanctions remain the premiere monographs on popular influences over US
foreign policy and the apartheid government. Borstelmann’s comprehensive analysis of US
policy during the Cold War in relation to international race policies places growing US activist
organizations at the center of the public debate over foreign policy.26 Nesbitt’s primary focus on
African-Americans and Black South Africans as anti-apartheid activists expands the traditionalist
view of foreign policy influences and this thesis expands Nesbitt’s analysis in include the Reagan
administration’s internal and public responses to growing anti-apartheid activism.27 Taking these
two works together within the context of public criticism of the Reagan administration’s foreign
policy towards South Africa creates a dynamic analysis of public influence on US foreign policy.
Expanding their focus, this thesis analyzes how anti-apartheid activists’ public efforts to criticize
the US-South Africa relationship caused internal policy shifts within the Reagan White House.

25

Donald R. Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969-1986,” Political
Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science) 111, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 127-149.
26
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line : American Race Relations in the Global Arena
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001).
27
Francis Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994.

16
After taking into consideration the work done on the role of media, internal deliberations,
my thesis brings together both the internal and external forces at play in the US-South African
relationship. These individual historiographical topics: the US Cold War foreign policy, southern
African regional stability, awareness of public perception, and anti-apartheid activism and
stakeholders in social and economic circles lay the early foundation of this research on the
United States-South Africa relationship.

Sources
This thesis uses an array of source material ranging from newspapers to government
documents, letters, memos, anti-apartheid tracts and newsletter, as well as oral histories. To
understand the perspective of Reagan officials during the policy formulation and subsequent
revisions, I analyzed memorandums and policy papers from the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library and similarly related digital collections from the National Security Archives. News
coverage as well as polling and survey data provide an insight in the public opinion on the
administration’s policies. Various anti-apartheid digital collections, interviews with former
activists including Elizabeth Schmidt, Prexy Nesbitt, and William Minter, and released South
African documents from the former apartheid administration and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission testimonies allow us to examine the perspective of nontraditional foreign policy
actors’ during Reagan’s administration. Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Chester Crocker, published his autobiography, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making
Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, in 1992.28 The volume delves into the minutia of eight years of
policy making and describes the subtle (and sometimes overt) public influences on Reagan’s

28

Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (USA: Norton, 1992).
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Africa team. This study uses Crocker’s autobiography as a primary source to highlight the
administration’s own struggle with crafting policy in response to public perception and their own
attempts at swaying it.
This range of material offers differing depictions of the events from 1980 to 1989. Such
conflict between source material informs this thesis’ central purpose to understand how the
public, comprised of both Reagan supporters and left-wing anti-apartheid activists, vied for
control of the American perception of the United States-South Africa relationship and influenced
policy making in the Reagan White House.

Statement of Thesis
This thesis focuses on a central question: How did nontraditional foreign policy actors
influence the Reagan administration’s foreign policy with apartheid South Africa? Over the
course of three chapters, this thesis argues that the Reagan and his administration frequently
defended its relationship with South Africa while anti-apartheid activists raised public awareness
as they criticized Reagan’s policies towards South Africa as ineffective and inefficient.
Furthermore, in spite of the Reagan administration’s attempts to publicly defend this
relationship, this thesis posits that anti-apartheid activists used public mediums of television and
newspapers, local campaigns, and congress to force changes in Reagan’s foreign policy
regarding South Africa and the southern African region.
By expanding the influences on Reagan’s relationship with South Africa to include
nontraditional foreign policy actors, the US-South African relationship becomes complex,
multifaceted dynamic where the public played a direct role. In fact, media personalities, antiapartheid activists worldwide, and activist organizations frequently influenced how the US

18
public saw the US-South African relationship. A careful study of their influences on policy
creation, rollout, and defense of constructive from 1981 to 1989 highlights the Reagan
administration’s obsession with public perception. Beyond Pik Botha’s May 1981 statement,
there were several more occasions where US and South African officials called attention to the
publicity of their relationship. In May 1985, President Reagan wrote to President P. W. Botha
about the newfound attention that the US public paid to the problems of South Africa as “never
before… on issues that touch the most sensitive nerves in our body politic.”29 Thus, this thesis
contends that the US public—including the media reporting on Reagan’s policies, lobbyists, and
members of anti-apartheid organizations in both national and local capacities— influenced
Reagan’s relationship with South Africa.30

Organization
Chapter Two covers the early influences on the Reagan administration. The 1980
Presidential Campaign and public speculations on future foreign policy created an early interest
in revitalizing the relationship with the Botha administration. During Reagan’s electoral
campaign and his first year in office, competing conservative influences from media and
politicians directly informed Reagan’s initial policymaking towards South Africa. It was during
this time that Constructive Engagement became the central policy of the United States on
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apartheid South Africa. Chapter Two concludes with the official announcement of the US
foreign policy towards South Africa after nearly a year of planning and drafting.
Chapter Three examines the period from October 1981 to 1983 with the response to
Constructive Engagement to the early beginnings of the Divestment Movement in 1983. The
Reagan administration’s fervent support of the Sullivan Principles—a gradualist economic
reform initiative—ensured the support of mainstream conservatives and major corporations.
Additionally, since anti-apartheid activists had not yet formed a solid coalition, the Reagan
administration was able to engage with the South African government for strategic minerals with
little US public criticism.
However, Chapter Four analyzes the impact of the Divestment Movement and the 1984
election on gradually shifting US foreign policy on South Africa. Jesse Jackson’s 1984
Democratic bid brought South Africa as a major foreign policy issue to the American people and
led to major news coverage of anti-apartheid protests against South Africa’s state-perpetuated
violence. In 1984, pressure from nontraditional foreign policy actors and politicians led to
widespread public awareness of the South African apartheid situation. Ultimately, public
awareness did not deter Reagan’s opposition to harsher economic sanctions and the
administration’s continued engagement with Pretoria. Instead, Reagan issued Executive Order
12532 as a preemptive response to the mounting cries for economic sanctions toward South
Africa. Chapter Four thus highlights a gradually building of anti-apartheid messaging through
economic rhetoric that challenged Reagan’s relationship with South Africa.
The fifth chapter examines Reagan administration’s critical policy reconfiguring which
took place between 1985 and 1988. During these three years, the Divestment Movement gained
traction worldwide with mounting support garnered across university campuses and liberal
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circles. Through news, campaigns, and demonstrations, the Divestment Movement called for
complete economic withdrawal from South Africa. Despite the pressure of the Divestment
Movement and the growing public criticism—which even started to influence Regan’s
conservative base—, the Reagan administration failed to satisfactorily revise its foreign policy.
When Congress deemed the Reagan administration’s previous diplomatic engagements
insufficient at facilitating change in the South Africa, it passed the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act of 1986 with bipartisan support. In the subsequent three years of Reagan’s
administration, State Department and National Security Council staffers focused on achieving
the regional peace agreement as the primary goal of constructive engagement. The heightened
public scrutiny on the United States-South African relationship, therefore, influenced shifting
regional stability and peace planning to determine the end of South Africa’s military occupation
of Namibia and easing of tensions between Angola and South Africa.
This thesis contributes to the foreign policy field by emphasizing the role of
nontraditional foreign policy actors in shaping and challenging US foreign policy. It examines
how anti-apartheid activists, as nontraditional foreign policy actors, worked throughout the eight
years of the Reagan administration to shift the US-South African relationship. This thesis invites
a future dialogue on how other nontraditional foreign policy actors have worked to change US
foreign policy in different areas and locations. At the heart of anti-apartheid activists’ campaign
was a question of equal rights in South Africa and the world, yet the same racial tensions remain
in current South Africa and the United States society.
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CHAPTER 2
CULTIVATING CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGMENT, NOVEMBER 1980-OCTOBER 1981
Introduction
United States foreign policy was a key topic during the 1980 Presidential election. With
the détente with the Soviet Union, and despite their earlier invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 and
the subsequent United States support for the Mujahedeen fighters, Ronald Reagan’s campaign
team positioned itself as the foreign policy alternative to Carter’s seemingly stagnant position.
As John Lewis Gaddis argued, détente as pursued by the Carter administration, failed to prevent
the rising Soviet influence in Developing States.31 The prolonged negotiation with Iran during the
hostage crisis of 1979 further showed the limits of the détente policies put forth by the Carter
administration.32 In the 444 days of stalled negotiations, Ronald Reagan presented himself as a
hardline anti-communist alternative to Carter. He used a galvanized Republican party to
emphasize his ability to improve the United States’ weakened world image. In doing so,
conservatives conflated both domestic economic stagnation with Carter’s foreign policy. In the
conservatives’ reinvigorated foreign policy proposal to protect American anti-communist
interest, Reagan stood as a refreshing relief from Jimmy Carter.
Under Reagan, conservatives sought to reengage with anti-communist allies, like South
Africa, in the Cold War strategic battle. After Jimmy Carter’s harsh criticism of the apartheid
regime, the white Afrikaner ethnic minority rejected any stable communications with the United
States and other Western allies. With growing tension between South Africa and Angola and
South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia, the United Nations’ Security Council passed
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Resolution 435—a ceasefire which would lead ultimately to the withdrawal of South African
forces and to Namibian independence—as the first step towards peace negotiations. Yet, South
Africa claimed regional security—Angola was hosting Cuban and Soviet troops—as an excuse
for the country’s continued delay in executing the measures negotiated under Resolution 435. In
doing so, the South African government posed itself as an anti-communist defender in the region.
South Africa’s geographical location and natural resources played directly into the US
national security efforts in the region. As major exporters of cobalt and chromium, the apartheid
government secured their stake in Western economies as emerging technologies like computing
and communications heavily relied on the two minerals. South Africa’s prolific gold and
diamond mining still influenced US consumption. Reagan saw South Africa as a potential ally in
their gradual reforms regional defense against communist regimes and in protecting US interest
in strategic minerals.
During his electoral campaign and the first year of his administration, competing
conservative influences from media, politicians like Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), and leading
figures like UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, directly informed Reagan’s rhetoric and the
initial policy towards South Africa. This chapter examines how these conservative values
influenced Reagan’s campaign rhetoric, galvanized his base for a landslide victory, and
influenced Chester Crocker’s early southern African policies. Yet, in the midst of the
conservative party’s control over a reinvigorated foreign policy, rising anti-apartheid activism in
the United States formulated an early criticism of the Reagan administration’s relationship with
South Africa. Attempts to influence this relationship by conservatives and anti-apartheid activists
dominated the first months of the Reagan administration and its policy formulation. However,
the Reagan administration went to great lengths to protect its strategic relationship with South
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Africa—whose natural resources and role in regional stability outweighed any concerns about
human rights violations.

The 1980 Campaign Influences: Anti-Communist & Anti-Carter
The Reagan campaign’s strategy for foreign policy was critical of Carter’s record of
rising tensions with anti-communist South Africa. South Africa’s increased isolation from
international organizations concerned major United States corporations who relied on Pretoria’s
exports of strategic resources like chromium and cobalt.33 Aware of the acute needs for such
exports in areas of emergent technology in his home state of California, Reagan sought to mend
and t0 improve the United States’ economic relationship with South Africa. He even went so far
as to claim, in the Santa Cruz Sentinel, that the United States, “may need South Africa more than
[the South Africans] need us,” echoing the sentiment of business E. F. Andrews, who highlighted
the dependence of the technology industry on these minerals.34 In campaign rhetoric, Reagan
channeled former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 1960 phrase in saying that many
American journalists are, “unaware of how strong the winds of change are blowing in South
Africa” as the gradual reforms towards apartheid pushed the Afrikaner government towards
power-sharing with its Black majority.35 Under a potential Reagan administration, these US-led
changes were subject to the influence of conservatives, anti-apartheid activists, and the media.
Five months after this op-ed, Reagan entered the Republican primaries for the nomination for
President.
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Yet, the South African exportation of critical minerals was only one facet of Reagan’s
early campaign. Appealing to dissatisfied voters, Reagan’s campaign promise to reengage the
United States interest abroad, especially against the Soviet Union, and presented Reagan as a
strong anti-communist candidate. From the conservative viewpoint, Carter’s prolonged years of
détente only emboldened the Soviets and allowed the USSR to extend its sphere of influence.
Consequently, Reagan advocated for increased and direct pressure on the Soviet Union through a
renewed support of anti-communist regimes in Developing States.36 Beyond Reagan’s own
rhetoric during the presidential debates, current and future Reagan team members furthered the
message of a stronger United States abroad under a Reagan presidency.
Before entering the Reagan transition team, Chester Crocker, a former National Security
Council advisor under Nixon, criticized Carter’s UN Ambassador Andrew Young and Carter’s
“laid-back diplomacy,” claiming that it neglected tangible foreign policy instruments that
emboldened communist regimes.37 Crocker used the rising legitimacy of the Islamist and
Marxist-backed Khomeini regime in Iran to further show that détente was a failed policy. He
coupled his assertions with the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) increased aggression
against Israel as evidence for poor diplomatic strategies, based on idealistic promises with little
substantive gain to protect US interests abroad.38 Reagan staffers used the increasing anger
against the Carter administration for meeting with PLO officials on the campaign trail. Reagan’s
categorical rejection of negotiating with the Iranian student hostage takers and the PLO
contrasted with Carter’s failed negotiations and was celebrated by conservatives.39 Conservative
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critique over Carter’s handling of Middle East highlighted why diplomacy in resource-rich areas
was a priority for the future Reagan administration, a priority that the campaigned centered in the
ideological warfare of the Cold War.
The Reagan campaign similarly placed the resource-rich area of southern Africa in the
context of the Cold War and the failure of détente. Chester Crocker especially criticized Carter’s
faltering in the region by reaffirming Reagan’s support for economic engagement with Pretoria.
Claiming that Carter and Young were playing into the “emotive issue” of Black Americans
protests against apartheid, Crocker questioned the feasibility of United States corporate
disinvestment from South Africa.40 Deeming it idealistic, Crocker warned that complete
divestment would weaken the American stake in the internal reform of South Africa from an
economic power stance. Furthermore, a continued investment in the southern African anticommunist ally would bolster a crippling South African economy after Carter’s withdrawal from
several trade negotiations. With a strengthened South African economy with continued US
importations, the government would invest in securing its borders against Soviet encroachment.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, a foreign policy advisor for the Reagan campaign and his future UN
ambassador, matched the conservative demands to restore the United States’ image as a
proactive anti-communist defender. In an essay in the conservative Commentary magazine,
Kirkpatrick criticized the Carter administration for encouraging democracy through selective
decision making and nonintervention. 41 Kirkpatrick argued that this nonintervention weakened
US national interests because of its inherent disengagement. Instead, she offered similar views of
a reinvigorated foreign policy of the conservative party, one that informed Reagan’s support of
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supporting anti-communist freedom fighters. This became known as the Reagan Doctrine. In
rationalizing alliances between anti-communist regimes with less than favorable human rights
records for the sake of Cold War stability, Kirkpatrick saw the potential of US-led reforms
“aimed at producing gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.”42 These continued
interactions with anti-communist regimes would, theoretically, lead to internal reform while
simultaneously advancing US interest. Ultimately, the US would facilitate democratic change not
through direct military engagement but through monetary support.
In southern Africa, this type of reform meant that the US would openly support the anticommunist freedom fighters and move beyond the failures of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter
administrations’ attempts at détente to control American interests in the region.43 The primary
concerns for the Reagan’s campaign were Angola and Namibia, to which South Africa
represented a pivotal ally to help against curbing Soviet influence. Angolan guerilla fighters from
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with its President Joe Savimbi, fought for power after
the Portuguese colonial power fell in 1974. The South Africa Defense Force (SADF) trained and
supplied UNITA to fight against the Soviet- and Cuban-allied MPLA.44 In an attempt to curtail
US intervention and direct support for anti-communist freedom fighters in Angola, US Senator
Dick Clark sponsored the Clark Amendment in 1976. 45 Ultimately, the amendment had a limited
effect, as Israel became a proxy in supplying US arms to Angola. During his campaign, Reagan
sided with the conservatives who supported the repeal of the Amendment as a way to

Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards.”
Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991.
44
Albert R. Hunt and Thomas J. Bray, “An Interview with Ronald Reagan,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1980, 26.
45
Prior to the Clark Amendment’s passage, hardline conservatives believed that the United States’ support for
UNITA was effective at prolonging the conflict and economically overextending Cuban and Soviet aid to MPLA.
Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy.
42
43

27
reinvigorate American anti-communist support worldwide. In a May 1980 interview with the
Wall Street Journal, Reagan reiterated his staunch support for anti-communist freedom fighters.
The President claimed that he did not see “anything wrong with [helping] someone who wants to
free themselves from the rule of an outside power,” as he discussed his potential support for
Savimbi in Angola against Cuban and Soviet forces. 46 By framing the regional tension as a rising
communist fervor, Reagan presented American voters with an alternative policy where military
aid could curb communist influence over the continued American impasse in the region.

Opposition during the 1980 Election: Disinvestment Discontent
During the 1980 election, given his lack of hard language and his unclear position on
sanctions against the apartheid government, several Black-owned newspapers worried about
Reagan’s negative impact on the relationship between the United States and other African states.
William H. Gray III, a Black Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania, shared these
concerns. He remarked that a Reagan presidency meant an “Africaless” foreign policy, one of
ambivalence towards the continent’s Black leaders and narrowness stemming from Cold War
boundaries. Like several African leaders, Gray feared that a Reagan presidency would lead to a
policy of self-interest for raw materials in the Developing States. Reagan’s resource-driven
diplomacy in the continent extended to southern Africa where the Reagan team preferred an anticommunist ally in control of the exports to prevent Soviet control over critical resources.
However, this self-serving foreign policy would prevent the cultivation of a reciprocal
relationship with African states opposing South Africa—these states had thirty-seven percent
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stake in US export business.47 The Congressional Black Caucus echoed these concerns over
Reagan’s unwillingness to engage directly with African heads of states. Furthermore, Gray cast
apprehensions over Reagan’s irrational abrasiveness towards the Soviet Union and Cuba in the
Third World. In criticizing Reagan’s own response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Gray
was among many Black congresspeople who attempted to show the irrationality of Reagan’s
foreign policy.48
Anti-apartheid activist organizations, like the Washington Office on Africa (WOA),
further criticized the Reagan campaign’s open support for the Sullivan Principles. Spearheaded
in 1977 by Reverend Leon Sullivan, a board member of General Motors, the Principles were a
voluntary, self-reporting organization to improve transparency in the working conditions and
worker relations in US-based businesses in South Africa. Sullivan rationalized that increased
self-accountability in businesses would improve social relations between different races.
Reagan’s campaign team continued to encourage corporations to sign onto the Principles instead
of advocating for increased economic sanctions against South Africa. Rather than help, however,
the Principles simply diverted the gaze of the public. Anti-apartheid activists argued that South
Africa maintained the trend of increased state-sanctioned violence with little to no substantive
economic changes.49
Independent researcher, who went to South Africa to interview Black and white workers,
further exposed shortcomings of the Sullivan Principles. Anti-apartheid researcher Elizabeth
Schmidt was among many academics who condemned the Sullivan Principles for being a

Jim Davis, “African decry Reagan candidacy, Gray reports,” Philadelphia Tribune, August 8, 1980, 19. The term
“Third World” is taken into the context of the Tribune article as well, the author recognizes this term is outdated and
uses the term “Developing States” from now on.
48
Jim Davis, “African decry Reagan candidacy, Gray reports.”
49
Pamela J. Smith, “U.S. Companies can stop the bloodbath in South Africa,” Philadelphia Tribune, June 20, 1980,
1.
47

29
piecemeal reform meant to sustain the apartheid system.50 The overall lack of sanctions within
the Principles offered no incentive for corporations to reform or, following the rationale of Leon
Sullivan, to help improve race relations within the country. In several interviews, Afrikaner
managers from Sullivan Principles-signatory corporations disclosed to Schmidt that they were
“paying lip service to the employment code,” of their American-based offices; they had no
intention of changing the business practices that marginalized Black workers.51 Schmidt’s
interviews also found a lack of progress in the evaluation mechanism; any mark of progress
whatsoever, no matter how small, automatically showed the corporation as “making good
progress.”52 Furthermore, despite having over a hundred corporations as signatories to the six
principles, over half of signatory status corporations had yet to fill out the self-compliance
reporting on workplace conditions. Yet, according to the general Sullivan Principles, these
corporations were gradually reforming South Africa from within. Ultimately, the self-reporting
accountability structure allowed corporations to use the Principles as “corporate camouflage.”53
Schmidt as well as many anti-apartheid researchers and activists continued to carry interview
records and documents to anti-apartheid groups who exposed the uselessness of the Sullivan
Principles and shared the information to the American public about the lack of racial progress in
South Africa. 54
Anti-apartheid activist equally criticized Reagan’s potential impact on the southern
African region. The WOA’s mailing campaign warned about Reagan’s support for the repeal of
the Clark Amendment and claimed that a Reagan presidency would roll back any progress made
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by the Carter administration at opening relations with the Angolan government. Newsletters to
WOA members stated that any attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment signaled a “renewed
collaboration with [apartheid] South Africa on Angola.” This reestablished, friendly South
African relations with Angola under Reagan would make engagement with other African nations
nearly impossible.55
Academics, including Ronald W. Walters, Professor of African-American studies and
senior policy staffer for Congressman Gray, and Robert L. Allen, editor of The Black Scholar
Journal in 1980, further challenged Reagan’s position on the Clark Amendment. Allen called
Reagan’s support of the repeal tantamount to “an all-out US and South African military
campaign against Angola.”56 Walters found it even more dangerous that, despite the
Congressional restriction on overt military forces, Reagan could seek covert aid to South Africa
through other Western allies.57 Walters advocated for increased attention by Black American
academics specifically to monitor Reagan’s policies and for further studies on the implications of
the Clark Amendment’s repeal in future United States-South African relations.58
The early anti-apartheid activists’ efforts and their criticism of Reagan’s South African
foreign policy failed to generate a collective voting bloc against Reagan. The November 1980
election ended with Reagan’s sweeping victory over Jimmy Carter. The majority of American
voters supported Reagan’s promises for a stronger stance against the Soviet Union and the
reclaiming of the American identity abroad more than they shared activists’ far-away concerns in

Washington Office on Africa, “Reasons Why the Clark Amendment should be Retained.”
Robert L. Allen, “Reagan and the Third World,” The Black Scholar 12, no. 4 (July/August 1981).
57
Ronald W. Walters, “The Clark Amendment: Analysis of U.S. Policy Choices in Angola,” The Black Scholar 12,
no. 4 (July/August 1981): 2-12.
58
Idem.
55
56

31
southern Africa. This did not, however, quell the attempts of anti-apartheid organizations which
maintained pressure on the new President during the transition period.

Reagan Elected and Crocker’s Initial Influence
The 1980 election marked a shift in Cold War diplomacy with renewed United States
proactiveness and the Reagan administration’s willingness to engage with apartheid South Africa
to achieve regional stability. Reagan’s landslide victory coincided with the publication of
Chester Crocker’s Foreign Affairs 1980 article. Crocker, who worked under Henry Kissinger
during the Nixon administration, observed his mentor’s use of realpolitik and saw the benefit in
using pragmatism over morality to advance US national interest. Crocker specifically applied
this doctrine to promote southern Africa regional stability and to shape the early outline for the
policy known as “constructive engagement.” With constructive engagement, the United States
worked to cultivate a credible and believable engagement with South Africa to address the
complex issue of race and equity.59
Through constructive engagement, Crocker theorized that encouraging change in South
Africa, rather than economically pressuring it, would gradually bring about larger reform.
Crocker recognized the role that South African resources played in the emergent technologies
and placed the US government in a position to “capitalize quickly on market or policy shifts in
other countries,” dependent on these resources.60 According to Crocker, a stable South African
economy properly incentivized by the United States would benefit the United States’ own
economy and national defense. Many Republicans in Washington encouraged a friendlier
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attitude towards Pretoria.61 For instance, Reagan’s campaign defense advisor, Joseph Churba,
was among the few who called for the end of longstanding international arms embargo to South
Africa.62
A few Washington officials, however, still thought that any veiled criticism of the
apartheid regime would turn Pretoria against the United States and remove a pivotal anticommunist ally in the region. This was indicative of the far-right conservatives’ own preference
to work with apartheid South Africa regardless of its internal race relations. Crocker addressed
this concern by subtly supporting South Africa’s continued security laws to meet the “rapid rise
of black expectations” at power-sharing.63 With this in mind, Crocker’s constructive engagement
remained a predominantly white-led economic reform between the two nations.64
Crocker’s early influence laid the foundation for the United States assuming policy of
constructive engagement in the southern Africa region. The conservatives’ criticism of Carter’s
foreign policy and their support for Reagan’s position to revitalize anti-communist allies and
promote gradual reform abroad helped the Republicans win in a landslide victory. While antiapartheid activists worried for what Reagan’s victory meant to the timeline for ending racial
oppression in South Africa, they matched the conservative vigor with their own increased
membership, nationwide campaigns, and growth of new organizations to establish broad support
against apartheid. However, the 1980 electoral victory of Reagan signaled to those in Pretoria
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that the United States was willing to resume diplomatic relations based on a Cold War alliance
for regional stability and gradualist racial progress.

Pretoria’s Gradual Reforms & Nuclear Power Matches Reagan’s Early Rhetoric
Prior to Reagan’s election, the South African government faced concerns of public
perception that informed its own gradualist calls for racial reform. Prime Minister Pieter Willem
Botha, commonly known as P.W. Botha, was a Nationalist Party (NP) icon who first came to
power as the Deputy Minister of International Affairs, then Minister of Coloured Affairs, and
finally the Minister of Defense under Prime Minister Vorster. Under Vorster, he built the South
African Defense Forces (SADF) to the zenith of power that came at the concerns of Frontline
States (FLS) and wariness of Western allies. In 1978, over a scandal that became known as the
Muldergate, Vorster voluntarily resigned from his post as Prime Minister and became state
president, a mostly ceremonial role without power.65 Drawing similarities from US President
Nixon’s Watergate, the Muldergate caused widespread concerns and swept through the echelons
of the apartheid government, launching investigations into its financial branches, foreign affairs
contacts with Israel, and into the lives of longtime veterans of the Pretoria regime.66 Upon
becoming Prime Minister, Botha was ready to restore the country’s international reputation and
get past this international embarrassment.67
His pragmatic belief that whites in South Africa must “adapt or die” favored gradual
economic reform—similar to those later supported by the Reagan administration.68 However, at
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the time, US intelligence officials and reporters were skeptical towards Botha’s reforms.
Although one report recognized Botha’s willingness to improve employment opportunities for
Black urban workers to ease employee relations, several others cautioned that any possibility of
equal power sharing between Black South Africans and whites was unlikely under Botha.69
Botha received early support from the incoming Reagan administration for these minor reforms.
However, abstract terms of economic improvement did not satisfy anti-apartheid activists or
many in the foreign policy apparatus.
For instance, US national security experts recognized the importance of economic
reforms for regional stability, but they were more concerned about South Africa’s growing
nuclear power. South Africa’s continued refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty was tied
directly to their claim of increasing Soviet influence in the region. 70 Contradictory evidence
showed that South Africa sought a sustainable enriched uranium supply for the Koeberg reactor
near Cape Town from France and Israel.71 The evidence confirmed the fears of the US
intelligence agencies as increasing calls for non-proliferation came from the United Nations;
South Africa was willing to rely on other Western allies, besides the US, to increase its nuclear
power.
Despite US intelligence concerns of South African nuclear proliferation, the Reagan
administration quickly opened discussions with South African energy and security officials to
supply enriched uranium through the French government as a means to circumvent UN
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embargoes.72 With Reagan’s election, South African officials were equally optimistic about the
perceived shared values for gradual racial reform as well as a more open nuclear exchange.
South African ambassador to the United States Donald Dole reported on his optimism, after
meeting with former director of regulation for the Atomic Energy Commission, L. Manning
Muntzing. Muntzing, with his direct ties to Reagan’s nuclear security apparatus, informed Dole
of the United States’ eagerness to “restore its credibility and reliability as a nuclear supplier,” to
Pretoria.73 Both Reagan and Botha, aware of the press coverage and mindful of national security
concerns, answered the calls for reforms in southern Africa with the same gradualist tones.
Pretoria’s confidence towards engaging with new United States leadership transformed
the public perception of the relationship between the two countries and opened diplomatic
channels. Upon Reagan’s election, the Johannesburg International Service broadcasted a
congratulatory message from Prime Minister P.W. Botha as well as from South African Foreign
Minister Pik Botha the following day, with the latter’s hopes for continued support against the
“slavery of communism.”74 With these statements, both officials reemphasized the importance of
the United States-South African work as Cold War allies. The continued reframing of the
relationship within an anti-communist ideology shaped the general policy stance for the Reagan
administration. While anti-apartheid influences collaborated in worrisome predictions about the
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future of Reagan’s foreign policy on the African continent, it was not enough to sway voters or
policy officials on the Reagan team.

US Policy to South Africa Formation Period
The Reagan administration, with Chester Crocker as its leader, formulated an African
foreign policy team based on Reagan’s campaign allusions of successful gradual reforms and
anti-communist doctrine. Reagan’s Africa policy group of 12 key decision makers crafted the
policies selectively and with particular regard to the influence of conservative think tanks.75
Notable members of the group included Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig— whose
anti-communist background from working in Nixon’s National Security Council informed his
vigorous support for a rollback policy in Developing States—, UN Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick—who echoed a similar proactive US intervention in southern Africa—, and Robert
“Bud” McFarlane—who would serve as Counselor to Secretary Haig until his promotion to
National Security Advisor in 1983.76 Reagan and his staffers ignored the outgoing Carter
administration’s warnings of the United States’ weakening credibility among Black South
African leadership and its difficulties in cultivating a large reform policy within South Africa.
Reagan and many of the African policy development team instead sought softer language when
describing South Africa. In spite of arguments for policies that recognized the inevitable
weakness of the regime, apartheid still sustained itself, often “by force of arms.” The Reagan
administration used soft language, describing South Africa as a “friendly nation.”77 Prime
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Minister P.W. Botha responded in kind, describing the new relationship necessary to the
maintain of “civilized value standards.”78 By depicting South Africa as a decisive and useful ally
in the fight against communism worldwide, Reagan and his team deliberately controlled the
narrative in the early months of the administration.
The Reagan administration’s messaging of South Africa as a necessary ally successfully
showed in national attitudes towards Pretoria. In a September 1981 Harris cultural survey, over
74% of voting Americans agreed that apartheid was not a justified system, while 54% believed
the United States needed to remain on “good terms” with the white government in the interest of
national security.79 Beyond highlights such as the 1976 Soweto Uprisings, limited exposure to
news about South Africa most likely explained the results. Yet, Reagan officials had successfully
convinced over half of the country to believe that it was necessary to craft an alliance with South
Africa. The United Nations, though, was still reluctant to the idea.
Crocker and Kirkpatrick openly criticized the UN and its bias against South Africa. In
particular, they attributed the inherited Namibian impasse to the Carter administration’s weak
handling of Security Council Resolution 435. Resolution 435 had set up the United Nations
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and called for the withdrawal of South African
occupying forces from Namibia. Upon full execution, the Resolution aimed to lead Namibia
toward independent rule. 80 After the January 1981 UNTAG meeting in Geneva, President-Elect
Reagan openly condemned what he construed as UN favoritism towards the Soviet-supported
South West African’s People Organization (SWAPO).81 Reagan officials argued that SWAPO,
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whom he described as “Russian stooges,” did not represent of the majority of Namibians, and
therefore could not participate in the negotiation during the peace talks. Crocker supported the
appeals from the conservative Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the minority party in
power, which claimed to represent Namibian interests.82
Popular conservative news outlets took this in stride. In his show Firing Line Broadcast,
William Buckley, Jr hosted several anti-SWAPO Namibians as further means of discrediting
SWAPO as the true “voice of Namibia.” Reverend Peter Kalangula relied on the tribal identities
of earlier SWAPO party members from Ovamboland, the South African controlled Bantustan in
northern Namibia, to make his claim of DTA being more representative of the Namibian
population and support for South African occupation. Indicating that the Ovambo people
consisted of a sizable portion of the Namibian population, but not the total tribal makeup of
Namibia, Kalangula criticized the UN rhetoric of self-determination when other Namibians
supported the DTA.83
What could be perceived as public stumbles in the early months of the Reagan
administration forced the first of many public justifications for its foreign policy. Shortly after
becoming the US ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick met with the chief of South African
military intelligence, Lieutenant General P.W. Van der Westhuizen. She then met with the
notable anti-apartheid and human rights activist, Bishop Desmond Tutu.84 Both officials had
opposite agendas; Van der Westhuizen wanted to sway the policy formation toward more public
favorability of the South African government while Tutu sought stronger language condemning
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apartheid from the Reagan administration. Black reporters from South Africa as well as
ambassadors to the US denounced the hypocrisy of Reagan administration in meeting with both
Van der Westhuizen and Tutu. In particular, the Sowetan wrote that the Reagan administration
gave the illusion of publicly admonishing apartheid, yet entertaining South African military
officials.85
Public justification of the emerging policy began nearly as soon as Chester Crocker
introduced the phrase “constructive engagement” and the term “linkage” on the international
stage. Congress, anti-apartheid activists, African leaders, and even South African officials
themselves all shared concerns over what constituted constructive engagement and what linked
the broader southern African strategy with apartheid. Crocker’s new strategy of constructive
engagement was particularly debated among the Frontline States. Officials of the FLS worried
that the anti-communist fervor blinded the Reagan administration to the humanitarian crises
brought on by South African aggression. 86 This marked the beginning of an aggressive public
defense for US strategies in the region.
Shortly after Kirkpatrick’s conflicting meetings, Chester Crocker went on an
unsuccessful exploratory policy research tour of eleven African states while awaiting Senate
confirmation in April 1981. Crocker described the trip as frustrating. The Frontline States
criticism brought negative publicity for the administration and Crocker’s policies.87 An Angolan
radio broadcast during Crocker’s visit condemned his campaigning for a racist regime, and
harkened back to earlier criticism from the FLS during the earlier UNTAG Geneva meeting in
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January.88 Another radio broadcast criticized Crocker for using the same tired lines used by
South African government, claiming that their aggression was to rid the region and Namibia of
the Soviet influence.89 Several FLS released a joint communiqué expressing grave concerns over
Crocker and Reagan’s intention to repeal the Clark Amendment soon before Crocker departed
back to Washington.90 The early concerns of anti-apartheid activists and supporters, like those of
Congressman Gray, appeared well-placed in saying that Reagan’s foreign policy for Africa was
“Africaless,” at least in considering US foreign policy in relation to other African states without
white minority-ruled South Africa.
Crocker felt an unexpectedly similarly tensed reception from the South African
government. In fact, since Reagan’s election, the Botha administration believed that Reagan had
failed to deliver on his campaign promises.91 Citing the FLS and UN pressure, Foreign Minister
Pik Botha expressed concerns about South Africa’s distrust towards the United States in their
support against SWAPO in Namibia. Department of State cables detailed Prime Minister Botha’s
further wariness towards the linkage policy. He saw the policy as an attempt “to satisfy the rest
of the world,” by forcing South Africa to de-escalate what Pretoria believed to be unrelated
regional tensions.92 Botha was not the only one to be skeptical about the linkage policy. As a
complementary condition towards constructive engagement, linkage tied any future regional
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peace agreements, including following through with the measures prescribed by Resolution 435,
to the simultaneously withdrawal of Cuban troops in from Angola and the SADF withdrawal
from Namibia.

Conservative Schisms Emerging During Policy Formation
The Botha administration and the FLS were not the only political actors concerned with
Crocker’s new policies. Due to delayed confirmation hearings, Crocker left for his eleven-state
tour without being officially confirmed by the US Senate. This delay challenged his legitimacy
as an official, prompting yet another justification of emerging foreign policy from Reagan’s
Africa team. Additionally, it exposed the early fractions in the Reagan’s conservative coalition—
the coalition that had brought him to the White House. It took careful and prolonged negotiations
with Congress to rally all Republicans behind Reagan’s policy towards regional stability.
For eighty-five days, far-right conservatives held Crocker’s confirmation. Crocker had
received the support of moderates in the Senate. Senator Majority Leader Howard Baker and
Senator Nancy Kassebaum, for example, argued that Crocker’s confirmation would provide a
conservative, yet level-headed, expertise to the necessary peace negotiations in Namibia.93
Republican Senator Jesse Helms thought otherwise and used his legislative hold to obstruct
Crocker’s confirmation. Helms’ verbose and often abrasive speeches on the Senate floor
disparaged Crocker’s supposed friendliness towards African governments and his rigid elitist
approach to foreign policy.94 Helms spoke to the far-right conservatives’ suspicions towards
students of Henry Kissinger, as Crocker had been. Like many right-wing congressional
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representatives, Helms was apprehensive of the growing communist influence in the region.
However, he did not believe that constructive engagement was conducive to fighting
communism and to bringing stability to the region—claiming it too ambiguous and still critical
of South Africa’s internal politics.
This dispute was, however, indicative of broader underlying tensions between the farright and moderate conservatives in the Reagan coalition that seemed unified in the electoral
landslide victory of November 1980. Senator Helms asked Crocker hundreds of questions in an
attempt to trip him up. He felt that Crocker’s views on apartheid were too critical of the Pretoria
government and not at all helpful in a partnership with the anti-communist bulwark.95 Helms
further disapproved of Crocker’s support for political change in southern Africa, particularly
with Robert Mugabe’s government of Zimbabwe or Sam Nujoma of SWAPO. Helms argued that
the destabilization in the region was a consequence of Crocker’s “unqualified support,” a
strategy of Marxist change that would only harm South Africa, the United States’ true Western
ally in the region.96 Helms believed that Crocker and his staff were too willing to engage with
Black South African leaders to challenge Pretoria leadership.97 Yet, Crocker did not meet any
Black opposition leaders during his South African stop on the tour.98
The drawn-out senate confirmation exposed the initial Congressional Republican divide
over foreign policy toward Africa. Albert Hunt, a staff writer at the Wall Street Journal, argued
that “while Senator Helms and a handful of like-minded colleagues can make a lot of noise here,

95

Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 91; Robert Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 490.
Senator Helms speaking on the nomination of Chester A. Crocker, S5885.
97
United Press International, “Crocker Confirmed in Africa Post” NYT, June 10, 1981, A4; US Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Chester A. Crocker, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981.
98
United States Department of State, "Crocker Mission: US media reaction [Regarding Chester Crocker's mission to
Africa] April 1981, DNSA, South Africa: The Making of US Foreign Policy, 1962-1989.
96

43
they clearly lack the support to take on the conservative-oriented Reagan administration.”99
Senator Jesse Helms’ gamesmanship in holding up the nomination signaled to African leaders—
including South Africa— that the United States was fumbling as it pieced together its foreign
policy. Crocker later considered Helms’ hold on his nomination as reflective of some South
African officials’ own concerns about and desire to shape said policies.100 Department of State
Press Secretary Dean Fischer attempted to downplay Helms’ concerns as he explained that
Crocker’s eleven state tour was a fact-finding mission, and not evidence of any formalized
foreign policy towards the region.101 Appeasing the far-right conservatives’ concerns on southern
African policies became a major factor in justifying policy during Crocker’s tenure. Yet, he was
altogether reluctant to recognize the power of a disaffected senator or larger far right
conservative groups to influence staffing decisions or policy rhetoric.102
Regardless, Helms’ stalling was the first of many instances where pressure on US foreign
policy forced defensive posturing from the White House. Crocker’s confirmation after his April
tour of Africa placed additional pressure on Reagan’s Africa team. So did Pik Botha when he
arrived in Washington, D.C. in May hoping to sway the administration toward more favorable
policies and to secure the United States’ support regarding the Afrikaners’ handling of Namibia.
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South African Officials Attempt to Influence Policy Formation
Pik Botha’s visit in Washington, D.C. May 1981 was tactfully used to advance South
Africa’s public image in foreign affairs. Pik Botha made public statements, after meeting with
both Reagan and Secretary Haig. He promised that South Africa was willing to engage with
Reagan and to become an anti-communist stalwart alongside the United States.103 However, this
willingness only went so far with the Afrikaner government. Crocker disclosed that, during
closed-door meetings, both Botha and Brand Fourie, then Pik Botha’s Secretary Foreign Affairs,
skirted around the question of Pretoria’s withdrawal from Namibia. Rather, in choosing to inflate
the “true meaning of Reagan’s election,” the Afrikaners proposed unclear and conflicting
concessions on the independence settlement in Namibia.104 The official recognition gained from
Reagan and Secretary Haig helped mend South Africa’s international image after the years of
stifled Carter diplomacy.
Botha found solace in Haig’s ideas of gradualism. Specifically, he welcomed Secretary
Haig’s dismissive attitude towards Resolution 435’s timed negotiation benchmarks. These
benchmarks, especially in the case of Namibian independence, threatened South African
interests.105 Without the implicit threat of punishments, gradualism promised to be more
constructive and to garner more desirable outcomes toward regional settlements.106 Without using
the phrase “linkage,” the white South African press discussed the package settlement favorably,
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but echoed Botha’s caution towards the UN supposed impartiality towards SWAPO.107 Following
the meeting, Botha extended the ideas of gradualism and negotiations to internal racial reforms,
crediting the Reagan administration for its revitalized approach towards reform. For once, it was
an approach where Afrikaners did not have to completely surrender power. 108 Botha used similar
language toward South Africa’s nuclear program and called into question the true validity of
earlier constitutional reforms during his visit in Washington.
News of Botha’s visit brought together angered Black South Africans and anti-apartheid
groups in a shared criticism over the new Reagan administration’s reengaged relationship.109 A
coalition of TransAfrica and WOA assembled over 500 people in a protest in D.C. during Pik
Botha’s visit. The coalition promised that similar demonstrations would continue as long as the
US kept close relations with Pretoria.110 The presence of civil rights leader Reverend Ben Chavis,
who described Botha’s visit as “a Klan meeting between common racists,” attracted media
attention to the small protest. 111 After Botha’s visit, TransAfrica continued to apply pressure. In
May, TransAfrica founder Randall Robinson leaked a State Department position paper written
by Crocker to the New York Times. According to Robinson, the documents showed that while the
United States had moved “rapidly toward an open and obvious alliance with military dimensions
in South Africa,” it had no intention in committing to a “any substantial movement on their
domestic viciousness,” i.e. the apartheid regime.112 Crocker envisioned a future where South
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Africa returned to the “regional framework of Western security interests,” as a restored actor
with which the US could cooperate.113 In another separately leaked memo to Haig, Crocker
affirmed that the United States would be willing to publicly cooperate with “a society
undergoing constructive change. 114 However, he informed Haig that he “must help to make this
approach credible.”115 In discussing these leaked memos, Robinson argued that the Reagan
administration had stopped pressuring South Africa to change their racial policies. Instead, the
administration had opted for an appearance of reform, just like businesses had opted for
corporate camouflage when “adopting” the Sullivan Principles.
This exposure and criticism of Reagan officials continued when Crocker visited South
Africa with Deputy Secretary of State William Clark in June 1981, only days after his Senate
confirmation. The Crocker-Clark mission to South Africa, occupied Namibia, and Zimbabwe
was another attempt to shape the narrative around the rekindled US-South African relationship.
Both P.W. and Pik Botha invited Clark to visiting a SADF outpost in northern Namibia, while
outfitted in military garb.116 Worried about a potential publicity backlash, Crocker understood
that South Africans could use Clark’s visit to the Namibian SADF outposts to show a US
alliance in regional wars.117 Crocker was not comfortable with obvious support for the SADF, but
he had hoped that a closer cooperation with South Africa would include the training of the South
African Coast Guard and the expanding the current military attaché exchanges.118 Die Burger, the
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Afrikaner nationalist newspaper, optimistically used Crocker’s testimony in front of the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Bothas’ own statements on the visit to show the
normalizing relations between the two countries.119 In a memo to Afrikaner security officials, Pik
Botha stated that the visit established a mutual trust and a shared agreement between the two
nations condemning the UN favoritism towards SWAPO.120

Rising Anti-Apartheid Activism
The African National Congress, the leading South African outlawed and exiled political
party, worked within the Frontlines States and the Organization of African Unity to train the
armed resistance wing of Umkhonto we Sizewe (Zulu)— the Spear of the Nation. Oliver Tambo,
the exiled ANC President, frequently travelled from Tanzania, where he was exiled, to allied
countries and the UN in New York City, to gather financial support, and to coordinate with antiapartheid grassroots organizations. Even prior to Reagan’s campaign for revitalized engagement
with South Africa, Tambo recognized the work of various worldwide anti-apartheid groups;
without them, he claimed, the “struggle would not have reached the level that it has today.”121
The US anti-apartheid activists’ challenge to US foreign policy continued with the
“Building Forces Against United States Support for South Africa” conference and rally in June
1981. Notable anti-apartheid activist, including D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, Nigeria’s UN
Ambassador Akporode Clark, Congressman Gray, Randall Robinson, Tambo, and SWAPO’s
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secretary Moses Garoeb, attended the conference.122 On June 8, the conference issued a
declaration which highlighted a shared anger toward the increasing South African aggression in
Namibia and the lack of American reprisal.123 The joint statement discussed the apartheid
regime’s “continued intensified resort to brutality and terrorism.”124 The South African
unchecked use of force constituted an international threat to peace and security which
jeopardized the lives of all South Africans and Namibians.
The conference was the first publicly received and nationally reported concerted effort to
rally US support against apartheid. Olive Tambo rightfully described it “as the starting point of
the total mobilization forces for justice.” 125 It sparked several national and local campaigns
pushing the administration to engage with the idea of dismantling the apartheid regime. Though
still in the early stages of policy formation, Washington’s message had been clear; the US-South
Africa relationship would be an open one willing to reform, with gradualist speed, but also
willing ignore racial offensives. The question was, for all the stakeholders involved, how far
would the United States go to maintain a constructive relationship with apartheid with little
substantive results towards racial equality.
While activists from TransAfrica and WOA pressured for accountability in D.C., several
other anti-apartheid organizations made headway in local and state levels of politics. Members of
the Africa Fund organization, part of the larger American Committee on Africa (ACOA), pushed
state legislators and college campuses to divest state bank loans from South Africa.126 State level
organizations, like the Massachusetts Coalition for Divestment from South Africa, frequently
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lobbied for economic sanctions, and used the missteps of the Reagan administration to press the
urgency of the matter.127 In May 1981, after Kirkpatrick/Van der Westhuizen meeting, the
Massachusetts Coalition drafted a leaflet in support of Massachusetts Senate Bill 1138 to divest
state pension funds.128
Divestment soon became a national topic of conversation. Activists like Dumisani
Shadrack Kumalo, Gail Hovey, Jennifer Davis met with state legislators and local community
officials to discuss the impact that their states had in propping up the economy of the apartheid
government. Kumalo, who worked in the Africa Fund, traveled extensively during the 1980s to
bring South Africa to people’s minds, for the fight to become “a local campaign, a homegrown
campaign,” against apartheid.129 This continued bottom-up pressure matched the early rhetoric of
Ted Lockwood, the executive director of WOA, when he asserted that United States corporate
support via loans and technical aid “further escalat[ed] the struggle.” Jesse Jackson, the President
of People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), called for an end of any American corporate
partnership with South Africa.130 This bottom-up approach and accompanying national rhetoric
laid the necessary groundwork for larger national campaigns that emerged in the mid-1980s like
the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) to attract national headlines and executive responses.
Foreign policy experts outside of the Reagan administration made their own conjectures
about the future of US-South African relations. Former US deputy ambassador to the UN,
Donald McHenry argued that, after the Crocker-Clark June mission, any friendly relationship
would “reward South African Government intransigence,” and would validate American
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shortsighted anti-communist goals.131 The OAU criticized the Reagan administration for
colluding with Pretoria to hinder Namibian independence by provoking a continued armed
struggle.132 In a joint declaration, the OAU further described the relationship as “an unholy
alliance.”133 Continued support for the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, from the OAU
additionally pressured the US-South African relationship. Nujoma publicly declared in the 1981
summer that the guerilla warfare in Namibia would continue so long as South African continued
it occupation and aggression.134 Seemingly taunting the international community, the South
African Defense Force increased its aggression in Namibian and neighboring Angola after the
Crocker-Clark mission. The following US response defended their strategic ally and reaffirmed
their Cold War alliance over Pretoria’s own aggression in the region.

South African Undeterred Aggression
Following the Crocker-Clark mission, South Africa increased resources to the SADF and
reemphasized South Africa’s position as an anti-communist bastion in the region. Critics within
South Africa, including high schoolers and churches, were not immune to SADF and police
violence.135 By limiting the movement and silencing voices of internal resistance, South Africa’s
military forces continued to its muscular intervention without impunity during the summer of
1981. The SADF destroyed radar and anti-aircraft installations in Angola to weaken SWAPO
and MPLA. Despite proof of South Africa’s unleashed and illegitimate aggression, Chester
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Crocker continued to draw on the Reagan administration’s rhetoric of anti-communist regional
stability to claim that severing of South African diplomatic ties would drive the region into
further chaos and disarray.136
Yet, it was the SADF itself that drove the region into further chaos and disarray. In
August and September 1981, the SADF staged its largest mechanized military operation—
Operation Protea—since their involvement in World War II.137 The South African government
warned the Angolan government that Pretoria reserved the right to attack SWAPO terrorists and
to build up SADF forces on the Angolan-Namibian border, if the Angolan government continued
to offer shelter and supplies to Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO soldiers. This cabled warning came as a
response to Nujoma’s threatening speech at UNTAG’s meeting in Geneva. At the meeting,
Nujoma threatened to increase SWAPO forces and to attack occupying SADF.138 By the end of
the eighteen-day Operation Protea, the SADF seized control of the Cunene province on the
Angola-Namibian border, displaced over 160,000 Angolans, killed over 1,200 SWAPO and
Angolan forces.139 The SADF documented and published evidence of their destruction, showing
the captured oil tanks and military equipment as war bounty to the press.140 This large scaled
aggression did little to help the Reagan foreign policy team defend its stance to reengage South
Africa on the basis of gradual reform.
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South Africa’s renewed aggression in Namibia marked another policy roadblock for the
Reagan administration. Crocker remarked that Operation Protea heightened FLS suspicion on the
credibility of South Africa’s commitment to peace negotiations.141 Operation Protea forced the
Reagan administration to take a carefully-crafted stance where Secretary Haig urged South
African immediate withdrawal but acknowledged the Angolan military support of SWAPO in the
following Security Council meetings. 142
Regardless of the FLS concerns at increasing South African aggression, the Reagan
administration started its push to repeal the Clark amendment. Secretary Haig rationalized that a
complete repeal of the Clark Amendment would open up all possible policy options in southern
Africa.143 Full repeal of the Clark Amendment did not happen until 1985, but Pik Botha
frequently encouraged it for the sake of regional security in the hopes that US would bolster the
South African military forces.144
Secretary Haig, in the October 1981 National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and
Broadcasters, stated the clear goals of Reagan’s southern Africa policy—without publicly
responding to the backlash against Operation Protea. Reagan’s African policy team envisioned
South Africa’s support for Resolution 435 with their withdrawal from Namibia. South Africa’s
willingness to follow through with Resolution 435 was contingent on Cuban troop withdrawal
from Angola within the next year, thus linking the different regional skirmishes together. With
the lofty goal of achieving full peace and independence by 1982, Haig claimed South Africa’s
acceptance of Resolution 435 with new provisions with the United States were clear signs of
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regional stability as an achievable goal within the year.145 There was no mention of influencing
internal race reform within apartheid, another facet of Chester Crocker’s constructive
engagement. Instead, Reagan’s African policy team articulated the idea of a US-South African
relationship which clearly prioritized an anti-communist regional stability.146 The Reagan
administration’s official policy to engage with South Africa, undeterred by Pretoria’s external
aggression or internal oppression, was not without public criticism from anti-apartheid activists.
The luxury of ignoring public criticism did not last. In the years that followed the Reagan
administration’s initial backpedaling of poorly planned meetings or misspeaks, anti-apartheid
activists’ swelling pressure translated to substantial policy reframing within the following year
and throughout Reagan’s tenure in the White House. Future arguments over international bank
loans, trade of strategic minerals, and divestment from South Africa, all while the apartheid state
increased its violence in Black townships and across its borders, galvanized anti-apartheid
organizations to maintain national and local attention.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMIC DISCORD OVER CONSTRUCTIVE ENEGAGEMENT
Introduction
During Reagan’s first term, the Africa team focused its southern Africa policy on
cultivating open and constructive relations with South Africa, minimizing economically
aggressive policies from Congress, and negotiating a new policy for the Namibian independence
settlement. To the administration’s credit, most Americans believed in the reluctant practicality
of South Africa as a Cold War ally on the continent. However, increasing activist pressure on
state legislators and Congress kept the economic argument of sanctions against South Africa as a
major policy option. The Reagan administration’s frequent outspoken support to bolster its Cold
War ally in the continent downplayed sanction talks.
The Reagan team initially relied on a relationship based on economic cooperation with
South Africa to sustain its continued military alliance in the region, especially as tensions with
Angola and Namibia increased. In justifying the need to finance the anti-communist bastion
against Soviet-influenced forces such as People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), Reagan maintained the
support of most transnational corporations operating in the region. Using a loophole in the
Export Administration Act 175 that allowed US trading to Pretoria’s more distant military
subsidiaries, Reagan continued its economic support of the apartheid military state. Antiapartheid organizations publicly rebuked the administration’s actions enough to prompt
congressional inquiries in US involvement in bolstering South African forces at the detriment of
its own people. Both the increasing coordination of anti-apartheid organizations and the
prominence of anti-apartheid leaders in congressional hearings transformed the anti-apartheid
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message—tying economic concerns of US engagement with Pretoria to the humanitarian
concerns of labor rights and violence.

Congressional and Executive Strategic Resource and Policy Concerns
Reagan’s Africa team—with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester
Crocker at the lead—advanced its southern African foreign policy in 1981 through the language
of strategic minerals and resources. This, the team felt, would limit oppositional support for
sanctions and divestment.147 Despite the growing international discontent, the Reagan team
worked at reestablishing the trade relationship that the Carter administration limited, especially
in terms of technology parts and equipment. The Reagan administration’s lax enforcement of the
congressional arms embargo was among the first targets of anti-apartheid activists.
Congressional hearings, in response to South African news reports, sought to uncover the
extent of this trading engagement. In December 1981, the Rand Daily Mail, a left-leaning South
African newspaper, reported a sale of computers from the United States to Pretoria’s Atlas
Aircraft Corporation, a military development corporation part the of Armaments Corporation of
South Africa (ARMSCOR).148 Rand Daily Mail wagered that this deal represented a test case for
future trade deals between the State Department and Pretoria through ARMSCOR-affiliated
businesses. Civil rights lawyer Goler Butcher testified to the Subcommittees on Africa and
International Economic Policy that US computer sales served as an “essential element in the
enforcement of the panoply of apartheid laws.”149 US embargoes outlawed direct sales to
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ARMSCOR, yet by supplying Atlas Corporation, the Reagan administration used a trading deal
loophole for this sale. In doing so, Thomas Conrad, a staff researcher with the American Friends
Service Committee, argued that the administration was giving the South African government the
necessary equipment to “design its own weapons and equip its state apparatus with awesome
repressive powers.”150 By 1982, Sullivan Principles signatory corporations, like IBM, had sealed
trade deals with ARMSCOR subsidiary companies.151 The early legislative oversight of Reagan’s
relationship with South Africa remained focused on the economic and Cold War parameters that
Reagan imposed early in his administration and provided substantive flexibility for the
administration to start economically reengaging with Pretoria.
With Capitol Hill’s increasing attention on the trade situation in South Africa, resources
and Cold War ideologies dominated most congressional dialogue in lieu of humanitarian
concerns.152 This economic focus initially limited Congressional oversight, especially when highprofile hearings on the status of embargoes with South Africa underscored the humanitarian
situation. Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Friend Service Committee and
TransAfrica advocated to Congress for increased legal oversight regarding the US enhancement
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of South African military in the name of Cold War defense.153 TransAfrica researchers frequently
pointed out that the technology used to bolster South African borders also aided South African
domestic police forces as part of the apartheid system. Yet, in an effort to limit Export
Administration Act 175, Reagan’s team presented Congress with an economically advantageous
argument for the continued support to their anti-communist ally regardless of its apartheid
policies.
The Conservative leadership on the Hill bolstered Reagan’s economic rhetoric in
committees. In supporting the United States’ economic engagement with South Africa, the
Senate Judiciary Committee investigated the rising threat of communist militant support of South
African anti-apartheid groups and the extent of their planned militant sabotage attacks against the
South African government. Chester Crocker, at a March 1982 hearing, explained the potential
danger of the communist influence in South Africa to the larger region as a national security
concern in Angola and Namibia.154 Continuing on the administration and conservatives’ frequent
support for South Africa, Chairman Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL) used the power of the
committee to label the African National Congress (ANC) as a Communist terror organization,
intent on sabotaging the stability of the Afrikaner government.155 In weaving both security and
economic concerns together, conservatives and Reagan’s Africa team, particularly Chester
Crocker, kept most of the Congressional focus away from sustained criticism of constructive
engagement.
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However, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and the Democratic-controlled House
of Representatives often criticized the administration’s policies concerning South Africa on
similar economic grounds. Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa and Representative
for Michigan, Howard Wolpe frequently used the Subcommittee to challenge Reagan officials
for relaxing the arms embargo and US trade engagement.156 Congresspeople partnered at public
events with anti-apartheid organizations to strategize on policymaking. In a keynote speech at the
International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia with the American
Committee on Africa, the Executive Director of the CBC, Francesta Farmer, called the renewed
trading partnership with South Africa “morally bankrupt,” as it only bolstered the apartheid
system.157 This late November 1982 Seminar was a legislative planning session between
congresspeople, members of Namibia’s SWAPO, and American and South African labor union
workers to organize against Reagan’s economy messaging on the Hill.158 The resulting
declaration outlined the legislation’s anti-apartheid agenda. Seminar attendees additionally
created a list of demands which included the immediate implementation of UN Security Council
sanctions against South Africa and the withdrawal of transnational corporations that supported
the occupying South African forces from the Namibian mining industry.159 Democratic Congress
members like Farmer and Wolpe blended both economic concerns with apartheid’s oppressive
policy in the anti-apartheid message and weaponized Reagan’s own economic rhetoric against
Crocker’s constructive engagement policy.
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Yet, Reagan still received favorable support from corporations for his policy to expansive
military and technological equipment to Pretoria, which saw increased profits from these
international sales. The administration used the international stage to signal its economic support
for South Africa and its resource economy. The rapidly declining prices of major export
commodities, like diamond and gold, brought huge deficits to South African corporations such as
the De Beers Corporations, East Rand Proprietary Mines, and the South African government’s
own investments in the early 1980s. The Atlantic reporter Edward Epstein predicted that “with
increasing pressure for the independence of Namibia… De Beers's days of control in black
Africa seem numbered.”160 To relieve the balance deficit downturn of 4 billion Krugerrand, South
Africa applied for a USD$1.1 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F).161
Leaked State Department cables highlighted the private efforts to support South Africa’s loan
application notwithstanding the recent UN resolutions calling for the expulsion of South Africa
from the I.M.F.162 Publicly, however, the State Department reiterated its abhorrence of the
apartheid system while recognizing the financial merit of supporting the anti-communist ally.163
The Reagan administration’s continuing diplomatic relationships with South Africa and
other anti-communist countries informed public diplomacy efforts in the Reagan White House.
Evidence of this multi-focused approach on diplomacy and public relations began with National
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Security Decision Directive 77 in January 1983. This Decision Directive set the State
Department and National Security Council’s priority on cultivating a favorable perception of
Reagan’s foreign policy. NSDD 77 established a 5-member Special Planning Group (SPG)—
made of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the United States
Information Agency, the Director of the Agency for International Development, and the
Assistant to the President for Communications—to coordinate public diplomacy relative to
national security interests and to monitor public favorability on foreign relation policies.164 The
NSC, in accordance with NSDD 77, bolstered economic support to democracy promoting
organizations as key messengers of Reagan’s foreign policy outside of the standard foreign
policy apparatus. Initially, South Africa was not under the direct purview of the SPG. Instead,
Reagan’s Central American policies with Nicaragua occupied the initial focus of SPG.165 In
Nicaragua, the SPG worked with public organizations to build favorably policy options with on
US support of the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime for the State Department to then explore. Yet,
NSDD 77 was a strategic step that committed bureaucratic focus on ensuring favorable
presentation of Reagan’ foreign policy to the US public. The extent of this interest was first seen
in SPG’s budget of $65 million in 1984 for “overt political action.” This earmarked funding went
directly the United State Information Agency (USIA), led by longtime Reagan ally Charles
Wick. Wick and Secretary of State George Shultz then selected conservative think-tank
organizations to financially influence research studies that supported Reagan’s economic
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message.166 The SPG and its particular focus on sustaining politically beneficial relationships to
advance Reagan’s foreign policy continued throughout Reagan’s tenure.
Capitol Hill’s and the White House’s prioritization of strategic resources over
humanitarian concerns dominated most political dialogues in the early years of the Reagan
administration. Reagan’s defense over South Africa’s economic situation prompted conservative
congressmembers to parrot their support in the Senate and to allocate funding to the SPG. In the
years that followed, Reagan’s SPG and the accompanying public diplomacy apparatus,
categorically transformed the role of policy making in South Africa. In response, anti-apartheid
organizers followed the strategy outlined in the International Seminar on the Role of
Transnational Corporations in Namibia’s similar economic-based tactics to oppose Reagan’s
economic argument. By first presenting an economically unfair situation to Black workers in
South Africa, activists extrapolated it to specific humanitarians concerns for social and political
rights for Black South Africans.

Anti-Apartheid Activists Use of the Strategic Resources
Following the “Building the Forces Against United States Support for Africa”
conference, anti-apartheid activists put their efforts into shifting the US policy away from
constructive engagement and toward harsher economic consequences and criticism of apartheid.
The coalition building seen following 1981 not only advanced the efforts of organizations like
TransAfrica or the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) to end apartheid on a national level
but also raised public awareness of the anti-apartheid message itself as membership increased
and donors came in with monetary support. Now armed with several examples of US

Walter Raymond, “Public Diplomacy NSDD [National Security Decision Directive] Implementation: First
Special Planning Group Meeting,” 1983, DNSA, The Making of US Foreign Policy, 1962-1989.
166

62
ambivalence towards South Africa’s oppressive internal dynamics in exchange for economically
strategic policies, anti-apartheid activists adapted their message against both the apartheid regime
and the current Reagan policy. Anti-apartheid organizations transformed Reagan’s rhetoric of
strategic resources to show the economic hardships placed on Black South Africans. In
establishing that Black South African’s labor situations remained unchanged, anti-apartheid
activists claimed constructive engagement stagnated change in South Africa.
The United States’ support for South Africa’s I.M.F. loan was among the many moments
where anti-apartheid activists further used economic-based criticism against the Reagan
administration. In several editorials about the $1.1 billion loan, religious leaders and antiapartheid supporters argued that the I.M.F. support would bolster apartheid’s military apparatus.
Some religious leaders affiliated with faith-based organizations, such as the Interfaith Center on
Corporate Responsibility and the National Council of Churches, denounced Reagan’s support for
the loan application. Calling attention to US Chase Manhattan bank for its more limited
economic engagement with South Africa, faith-based organization called Reagan’s support a
“mockery of [the]… conscience by US banks.” 167 The Democratic House echoed its concerns
over the loan. In several letters, House Democrats urged the Treasury Secretary Donald Regan to
rescind its support and criticized the administration for politicizing the I.M.F. while financially
supporting oppression in Pretoria. If the I.M.F. approved the loan, the letters argued, the US
would be responsible for $200 million of the $1.1 billion.168 House Africa Subcommittee
Chairman Howard Wolpe bluntly described South Africa’s economy as “inextricably bound up
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with the politics of apartheid,” and supporting the I.M.F. loan articulated US support for the
apartheid system.169 Nonetheless, the I.M.F. voted in early November to grant South Africa its
largest grant application to the Republic. Of the 140 voting members, sixty-eight of the African
and Middle Eastern members voted against South Africa’s application.170 The United States’
lobbying during the meeting likely influenced the favorable result for the South African
government.
Anti-apartheid activists’ influence on the House spurred Democratic legislation and
investigations into US economic support of apartheid while expanding the reach of their
economic message against apartheid. Democratic congresspeople moved to limit the Treasury
Department’s role in the I.M.F. In May 1983, California Representative Jerry Patterson
introduced an amendment to the House Banking Committee bill to bar the nation from
supporting I.M.F. loans to South Africa.171 In an effort to pass the annual foreign spending bill,
Senate expanded the House’s restriction to bar both apartheid and communist governments from
receiving US Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund’s support in the
International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, S.695.172 Fernand St. Germain (D-RI),
Chairman of the House Banking Committee, told reporters that S.695 would not pass if it did not
include language prohibiting future loans to apartheid governments.173
Oppositional editorials and reporters described Reagan’s anti-communist justification as
an illogically planned policy that underserved the economic interests of the United States. David
Tongue and Quentin Peel, researchers at the political think-tank Center for International Policy,

Center for International Policy, “Congressional Opposition to the IMF Loans to South Africa,” October 18, 1982.
Clyde Farnsworth, “I.M.F. Loan to Pretoria is Voted,” NYT, November 2, 1982, D1.
171
Clyde Farnsworth, “House Unit Would Curb I.M.F. Loans to Pretoria,” NYT, May 6, 1983, D1.
172
US Congress, International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, S.695, 98 th Cong.
173
Jonathan Fuerbringer, “I.M.F. Bills Advances in House,” NYT, July 30, 1983, 33.
169
170

64
leaked I.M.F. board meeting minutes on South Africa’s application and exposed that the US’
continued to support the South African government. Tongue and Peel exposed the United States’
ambivalence towards the unfair labor practices forcing Black workers into unskilled positions.174
TransAfrica’s Legislative Assistant for Political Military Affairs, Salih Abdul-Rahim, argued
that South Africa’s I.M.F. loan only “refurbish[ed] its war chest,” against its own people.175
Additionally, anti-apartheid activists reported on the divisive labor situation in South Africa
where strenuous working conditions in the strategic mineral mines predominantly impacted the
health of Black South African miners. Nonetheless, the Reagan administration remained
steadfast in its efforts to bolster South Africa’s economy. New York Times’ Alan Cowell
observed that “Washington’s sense of strategic interest outweighs” any other workable African
policy without the white-led South Africa as the key player.176
International news outlets heavily reported that South Africa in the early 1980s was
fraught with labor strikes and state-perpetrated violence on Black South Africans.177 Antiapartheid activists used news coverage to educate the US public about the reality of South Africa
and Reagan’s failed policies. Anti-apartheid activists maintained the attention of the US public
on humanitarian concerns as well by frequently exposing imprisonment and violence in Namibia
at the hand of the SADF, and news of internal resistance within South Africa. While publicizing
the turmoil in South Africa, anti-apartheid activists emphasized the shortcomings of constructive
engagement’s supposedly economically-friendly policy. In operating in both an economic and
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humanitarian-based argument, anti-apartheid activists highlighted the overwhelming rise of
Black trade unions in South Africa with labor strikes seen in the strategic mineral mines. In July
1982, 12,000 Black goldminers struck across eight mines against unequal pay and unsafe work
conditions. In response, the South African police killed eight strikers and relocated over a
thousand workers to the homelands in retribution.178 This report followed the several more
critical coverage in national and local papers on the widespread strike in July.179 That November,
PBS’s Nova science series broadcast a special episode that detailed the intertwining of the US’
interest in cobalt as a strategic mineral and the health consequences of the mining on the Black
workers striking an additional blow to constructive engagement.180
Salih Abdul-Rahim, then TransAfrica’s Legislative Assistant for Political Military
Affairs, gave credit to the anti-apartheid organization’s ability to collaboratively promote the
economic-humanitarian goals to end apartheid.181 This anti-apartheid message carried onto
Congress with the S. 695 and into public forums of television. Consequently, the continued stateperpetuated violence in South Africa strengthened the anti-apartheid message.

Regional Peace Attempts and Setbacks
Reagan’s Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s early prediction of achieving
regional peace within a year of Reagan’s arrival to the White House was an unrealistic
conclusion. Yet, even with the appointment of new Secretary of State George Shultz, the Africa
team struggled to navigate South Africa’s continued aggression towards its neighbors to achieve
TransAfrica with Salih Abdul-Rahim, Mark Wenner, and Anne Kabagambe, “TransAfrica News Vol. 2, No.4,”
Summer 1982.
179
AP, “Around the World; 1,000 Blacks Leave South African Gold Mine,” NYT, July 5, 1982, 2; UPI, “New Unrest
Among Black Workers Shuts a Gold Mine in South Africa,” NYT, July 6, 1982, 3.
180
Walter Goodman, “TV: ‘Cobalt Blues,’ on Strategic Minerals,” NYT, November 23, 1983, 15C.
181
Robin McGinty, “TransAfrica: Black American's Influence on Foreign Policy,” The Hilltop: 1980-1990, January
14, 1982.
178

66
the peace resolving efforts of UN Resolution 435’s Namibian independence framework.182 The
South Africa Defense Forces’ military raids of African National Congress outposts in Maseru,
Lesotho, that killed thirty-seven people and decimated housing in twelve different areas of the
capitol in December 1982, did not make the regional peace building any easier.183
Crocker’s team tried to placate South African security members by asserting that South
Africans could not use the United States’ relationship as cover for an aggressive policy of air
strikes and raid. However, the South Africans were resolute in defending their borders regardless
of “any external power” or United States’ caution.184 Thus, FLS leaders like Angola refused to
separate South African aggression with the United States’ unwillingness to publicly check
Pretoria’s military based on Reagan’s continued support of its anti-communist position.185
Crocker and the rest of the Africa team focused on curbing South African aggression by
asserting that constructive engagement was a viable foreign policy instrument from 1982 through
the end of Reagan’s tenure.
Yet, despite increased congressional oversight into the trading relationship with South
Africa, the State Department continued to sell military supplies to Pretoria. A report from the
American Friends Service Committee in January 1984 argued that the highest level of authorized
US commercial sales to Pretoria was from 1981 to 1983 with an increase of $28.3 million sales
of military equipment.186 The report detailed how the State Department exploited loopholes and
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justified sales to Pretoria on the basis of anti-terrorism against the ANC.187 The ANC’s public
outlets described the United States open collaboration with South Africa to “exchange of
intelligence and military personnel and information,” and to sell advanced computers and
enriched uranium in an efforts to sabotage the FLS.188 This exchange between the United States
and South Africa supported apartheid’s aggressive regional control and sustained South Africa’s
oppressive control of the South African Black population.
Supplied with United States’ arms and advanced technology, Pretoria’s forces attempted
to maintain their political power and to cripple Black resistance under the guise of crime
control.189 The South African “Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill” of late
1982 expanded the restriction on Black movement and enabled the police to enforce the
passbooks—documents that implemented movement restrictions and dictated preapproved
locations and curfews for individual Black South Africans.190 The Black Sash organization, a
mostly white liberal women-led organization in South Africa, referred to the bill as influx
control—dictating the movement of Black bodies traveling throughout South Africa for work
and into townships.191 A growing number of trade unions’ peaceful protests and sit-ins frequently
broken up by local police also garnered US news attention. These trade unions fought against
exploitation, unfair wages, poor living conditions in townships and sought to reclaim their labor,
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or “black gold.”192 Supplied with US shock batons and weaponry, SADF used advanced
surveillance systems and imprisonments to curb labor resistance. In some instances, this state
violence was unprovoked. One 7,000 South African police ten-hour raid in the Sebokeng
township in 1984 led to the arrest of hundreds of people.193
The Reagan administration frequently defended its relationship with South Africa despite
the rising state violence to US media outlets citing the Afrikaner government’s efforts at gradual
reform. But according to the US press, even governmental reform was not adequate enough
justification for continued US economic engagement with Pretoria. The new 1984 constitution
established the tricameral parliament where white, Indian, and Colored races were represented in
separate legislative chambers.194 One US report stated that the tricameral parliament epitomized
Botha’ government’ superfluous apartheid reforms and were a sham. 195 Under this new system,
the President largely maintained control over the legislative agenda.196 According to Crocker, the
“favorable climate of change” in the apartheid regime showed a “new willingness” of the white
government to step in the right direction of political representation.197 Crocker claimed that
Botha, formerly Prime Minister now State President, supposedly increased political participation
for Indians and Coloreds.198 Yet, Black South Africans still had no political representation in this
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new tricameral parliament. Botha justified this parliament exclusion claiming that the six
Bantustans emulated Black self-rule and that Black political leadership in the townships was too
closely tied to Communist organizations. But even with new proportional representation of nonwhites in South Africa, several hundreds of white liberal and Black organizations denounced the
constitutional reform as indicative of Botha’s total strategy against Black organizations under the
rouse of anti-communism.199 Following the vote on the new Constitution, the industrial Vaal
triangle area south of Johannesburg, including the Sebokeng township, erupted in massive
unrest.200 A State Department internal memo admitted that the “seriously flawed” new parliament
was, in part, responsible for SADF violence, arrests, and voter intimidation—despite the public
approval of the new constitution.201
Nonetheless, the Reagan administration sought to salvage South Africa’s reputation on
the international stage and within regional negotiations. The administration frequently supported
the release of high-profile anti-apartheid leaders, albeit ones not directly linked to the ANC. For
example, Crocker encouraged Foreign Minister Botha to keep up pretending to work towards a
peaceful unbanning negotiation between Afrikaner Reverend Beyers Naudé and the South
African Minister of Law-and-Order Louis Le Grange.202 Naudé was forced into house arrest in
1977 following his support for the multiracial Christian Institute of South Africa; he was
ultimately released in late 1984.203
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Another concern of the Reagan’s Africa team on South Africa was the stalled
negotiations with Angola and Namibia on implementing Resolution 435 for Namibian
independence. These delayed negotiations prompted Crocker to extend open communication
with the SADF-supported National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
UNITA’s singular negotiations with its ally stifled any open dialogue with the FLS or MPLA on
curbing violence between the two Angolan parties. Crocker recognized the power that meeting
the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, potentially had in removed South African-inducted
skepticism towards Cuban willingness to negotiation its withdrawal from Angola.204 The ensuing
four-hour meeting between Crocker and Savimbi was no doubt influenced by the growing
restlessness that followed Crocker’s remarks that the “time [was] ripe for talks” between all
relevant parties—including UNITA—involved in the 435 negotiations.205 Crocker foresaw a
formal meeting between the South African, UNITA, and the Soviet-supported SWAPO
leadership as a step towards more open discussions between conflicting Angolan UNITA and
MPLA. Whereas the United States sometimes urged actions of goodwill, other times the
administration cautioned that South Africa’s delayed willingness to engage allowed “the Soviet’s
agitpropaganda [that] can poison the wells of southern Africa.”206 Involving UNITA leadership
was, according to Crocker, a pivotal step in repairing South Africa’s regional image, as it
signaled to FLS the country’s willingness to engage and support UNITA-led negotiations.
Crocker cautioned South Africans against abstract language in negotiations with the Soviet
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Union. Crocker’s letter speaks to Reagan’s own concern over the presentation of reform in
southern Africa to the broader public, including international actors.207
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CHAPTER 4
THE DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN AND 1984 ELECTION IMPACT
Introduction
In the wake of increasing state violence and anti-apartheid activists’ arguments on the
irrationality of constructive engagement, Reagan’s economically friendly policy could not
sustain itself. Divestment supporters’ actions on university campuses and in front of state
legislatures further nationalized the debate as sanctions were discussed in the Democratic
primary race of 1984. This chapter examines how rising anti-apartheid activism using the images
of South Africa to increase public awareness of South African state violence and, in turn, to build
alliances against constructive engagement as a failed policy of the Reagan administration. This
chapter expands on historian Francis Nesbitt’s theory that liberal involvement in the antiapartheid movement increased the movement’s publicity. In widening Nesbitt’s scope to include
mass activist organizations, this chapter looks at the deliberate influence of anti-apartheid
activists on Reagan’s southern African policy.208 In creating a multifaceted anti-apartheid
message centered on both humanitarian and economics concerns, anti-apartheid activists shaped
the public perception through state and federal campaigns, news broadcasts, and open protests.
The anti-apartheid activists’ challenge to the President in public forums thus called into question
the validity of Reagan’s foreign policy—to the point of forcing policy reframing in September
1985 with Executive Order 12532.
Spurred by an increase in legislative oversight by the House Democrats, anti-apartheid
activists and Divestment supporters continued their economically-based message against
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Reagan’s relationship with South Africa. The action of grassroots activists and far-reaching
networks who pressured local and state officials the Divestment Campaign. Their tactic
gradually yielded small but pivotal legislative victories. Following S.695’s passage to bar US
support of the I.M.F. to Pretoria, Jennifer Davis, the Executive Director of the ACOA,
recognized Divestment supporters for their continued engagement with state legislators.209
Speaking to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, Davis made an important note on the
Divestment Campaign’s grassroots approach. The Divestment Campaign’s approach changed the
minds of the local legislators, who then pressured state and federal legislators and, eventually the
US foreign policy at large.210 Anti-apartheid activists worked through state and local legislators
in coordinated, grassroot networks to convey the anti-apartheid message to target sectors of the
American public directly. The political effects of the anti-apartheid efforts were not immediately
apparent with the landslide re-election of Reagan. However, despite the lack of political success
on the national stage, anti-apartheid activism remained a featured American news topic.

Divestment Efforts
Pressure from divestment organizations continued under Reagan at the academic, city,
and state levels. The Massachusetts Coalition for Divestment from South Africa campaign
provided one such example of a state to divest $68 million from companies operating in South
Africa.211 While divestment remained the oppositional viewpoint to the Sullivan Principles,
Reagan officials and supporters attempted to strengthen the Principles’ efficacy in response to
the Divestment Movement’s mounting attention. Yet by 1983, nearly a third of signatory
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corporations had left the Principles. They opposed the additional requirement that forced them to
recognize Black unions and to perform additional audits on workplace conditions.212 Sullivan
reaffirmed the Principles’ motivation to maintain American business influence over Pretoria.
However, with increasing number of businesses not following the Principles and rising calls for
divestment, supporters of the Principles—including the President—struggled to show its success
at reforming and ending apartheid.
The Divestment Campaign’s local efforts brought the far away events of apartheid into
the homes of everyday Americans. ACOA researcher and organizer Prexy Nesbitt described the
Campaign’s education efforts to meet and explain to state legislators how pension funds or
endowments were directly linked to South African businesses. Nesbitt referred to the local
education efforts as uncovering the “iron curtain of ignorance” of the American public on
apartheid.213 Reflecting Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo’s stance that the Divestment being a
“homegrown campaign,” the local campaigns were slowly recognized by legislators.214 By
January 1983, states including Minnesota, Oregon, Kansas, and Nebraska passed divestment
legislations and twenty-three other states considered divestment as part of their legislative
agenda.215 The pressure was felt in Pretoria. The Rand Daily Mail reported that Dr. Ernie van der
Merwe, the head of South Africa’s Central Bank, was concerned that divestment could lead to a
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twenty percent drop in foreign investment.216 Clearly, the efforts at universities, localities, and
states had a financial impact on apartheid’s governance. To make up for the loss of revenue, the
South African government’s international loan applications increased to supplement the loss of
foreign investment.217
The pressure on American politicians was equally apparent. John Chettle of the South
Africa Foundation claimed that divestment was such a divisive argument that it allowed antiapartheid activists to label any politician voting against the measure as racist.218 The talks of
divestment swept across the United States in time for the 1984 Democratic Presidential primaries
and general election. As Randall Robinson accused the Reagan State Department of being the
most “Pro-South African” department since World War II, the national debate over proper
economic policies against South Africa consumed the campaign arguments yet again.219
The 1984 Election
Civil Rights leader Jesse Jackson, who visited South Africa two years after the death of
Steve Biko, was among the first Democratic contenders to extend his foreign policy focus to
South Africa.220 Involved in the anti-apartheid movement prior to his presidential bid, Jackson
had supported other national Black figures like singer Harry Belafonte and tennis player Arthur
Ashe in the “Artists and Athletes against Apartheid cultural” boycott of South Africa in 1983.221
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Even Jackson’s early efforts in local divestment efforts carried significant promise to the larger
Divestment Movement. In 1983, while still President of PUSH—Operation People United to
Save Humanity—, Jackson worked with University of Michigan student groups to pressure the
Regents to divest from South Africa and to “be a voice to the voiceless.”222 While Jackson did
not mobilize enough voters to win the presidential nomination for his party, his human rightscentered campaign elevated marginalized voices on foreign policy. It also magnified the hope of
Dennis Brutus—the South African exiled writer living in California—that “the resistance of the
people… become the focal point” of national discussion.223 According to Brutus, the 1984
election forced Americans to choose between being complicit with constructive engagement or
maintaining pressure on the Reagan administration.224
In the months leading to the Democratic National Convention, Black Americans
frequently repeated Jackson’s human rights centered message on South Africa and extended it to
other foreign policy regions such as Grenada and Lebanon, in which the Reagan administration
used similar anti-communist national security messaging to justify invasion. Speaking to the UN
Special Committee against Apartheid in June, Jackson argued that in order to shift US foreign
policy against oppressive regimes, activists must first shift the “United States public opinion in a
new direction.”225 This new direction followed the anti-apartheid call for increased support for
Black resistance groups and for harsher punishment against oppressive governments like the
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apartheid regime. Other Democratic contenders, like Walter Mondale from Minnesota, soon
echoed Jackson’s call for increased sanctions against South Africa in public debates.226
However, recent peace agreements between South Africa and Angola on troop
withdrawal boded well for Reagan’s “victory for negotiation” tactic.227 Jackson continued to
energize anti-apartheid activists in the foreign policy debate, even when Mondale was well on
his way to securing the Democratic nomination. At the Democratic Convention, Jackson’s
passionate speech described the United States as being at “its worst” and in moral disgrace as it
continued to work with South Africa and to ignore cooperative trading opportunities with the rest
of the continent.228 Jackson helped organize an anti-apartheid demonstration in Kansas for the
final Presidential debate.229 As a result, South Africa foreign policy made national headlines in
the lead up to the debate between Reagan and Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri. Mondale
supported Bishop Tutu’s claim, in his acceptance for the Nobel Peace Prize, that Reagan cozied
up with apartheid despite the humanitarian concerns in the debate.230 But Reagan overcame
Mondale’s criticism through his own ability to sway public opinion. Reagan famously countered
concerns over Reagan’s age in this debate by emphasizing Mondale’s own “youth and
inexperience” in foreign policy making, an irony considering Mondale’s lengthy career as a
legislator.231
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Further efforts by the Reagan administration to defend its relationship with South Africa
continued during the campaign. The House attempted to renew and amended the Export
Administration Act of 1979 that prohibited the United States from investing in companies not
endorsing the Sullivan Principles.232 Private memos from Reagan’s Chief of Staff—James
Baker—discussed lobbying Senate Republicans to halt the bill’s renewal to protect Reagan prior
to the October debate. Rather than bow to the Democrats’ “indictment of the Administration’s
failed policy of constructive engagement,” Baker successfully pressured Senate Republicans to
halt the renewal of the Export Administration Act.233 Removing the possibility of Reagan’s veto
also lessened the pressure from the press on the eve of the October debate. Furthermore, it
limited the possible debate time Reagan would have to spend defending his veto on the renewal
the Export Administration Act and his support of South Africa.234 This clear and deliberate action
to preserve a favorable view of Reagan’s policy and candidacy underscores the true intention of
the Reagan administration on cultivating change in South Africa. Reagan was unwilling to lend
support to Congress on enforcing the Sullivan Principles to dictate trading policies with South
Africa. The Republican halt of the Export Administration Act legislation ensured that the
executive branch was in charge of export regulations, including trade to non-Sullivan Principles
signatory businesses in South Africa until late 1985.
The Reagan administration’s additional efforts to limit the discussion of sanctions was
funding research projects to provide evidence towards constructive engagement’s supposed
effectiveness. The administration supported for the South African Institute of Race Relations
financially to conduct research on Black union workers’ view of international sanctions was one
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such example. The resulting survey from the South African Institute of Race Relations research,
gathered primarily from white South African workers who identified as conservative, supported
Reagan’s constructive engagement. In the survey, seventy-five percent of the 551 interviewed
workers disapproved of divestment efforts on the grounds on potential economic impact.235 This
effort coupled of strategic legislative pressure on Congress to halt the Export Administration Act
renewal and selective polling within South Africa during the latter months of the 1984 election
salvaged Reagan’s southern African foreign policy to the public.
Yet apartheid had yet to become a national security crisis for most American voters
looking at the various Cold War hot zones in 1984. While voter turn-out rose for the first time
since the 1960s, voters did not collectively favor the anti-apartheid stance yet.236 In reflecting on
the landslide Reagan victory, Washington Post reporter William Raspberry claimed that the
public’s general perception was that Reagan stood for American issues. Consequently, Mondale
with his internationalist stance failed to create a energize platform of truly American issues,
including those on domestic and foreign policy compiled from Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition.237
However, Raspberry’s attention to Reagan’s ability to shape American’s general perceptions
categorically ignores the similar efforts outside of the candidates to shape campaign policies.
While early November seemed bleak for anti-apartheid organizations’ prospective policies of
increased sanctions, these organizations soon held national attention in the weeks that followed.
In leading mass mobilization across the country in the fallout of the 1984 election, anti-apartheid
organizers further empowered the small locality-based organizing still hard at work.
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Domestic Struggle for Good Publicity
In the weeks following the 1984 election, anti-apartheid activists scheduled a meeting
with the South African embassy in Washington, D.C. On Thanksgiving eve, TransAfrica leader
Randall Robinson, D.C. Representative Walter Fauntroy, and US Civil Rights Commission
lawyer Mary Frances Berry met with South African diplomats for forty minutes.238 At the
meeting, they shared a list of demands with South African Ambassador Bernardus Fourie. The
list included the release of Nelson Mandela and of thirteen Black labor resistance leaders, all
political prisoners. While a small crowd of protestors stood outside the embassy, the three
refused to leave the premises until the South African government met their demands. Embassy
officials arrested them on the charges of unlawfully entering the embassy.239 Five days later,
Capitol police arrested Michigan Representative Charles Hayes and President of the Southern
Christian Leadership Council, Reverend Joseph Lowery, on unlawful entry charges, for
employing similar tactics outside the embassy.240 Each time, protesters waited outside the
embassy with signs calling for the release of the political prisoners and the end of the apartheid
system.241 The arrests of Congresspeople and high-profile activists, like Robinson and Berry,
garnered national attention over the Thanksgiving holiday. Prompted by the continued state
violence in the Black townships, the embassy sit-ins participants described their actions as an act
of “moral witness” against apartheid and as a public solidarity effort with the labor organizers in
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South Africa.242 In the weekend following the initial sit-in, the organizers named their group the
Free South Africa Movement (FSAM).243 Overnight, the FSAM made national headlines as daily
demonstrations and arrests occurred at the South African embassy. Rosa Parks participated in the
sit-in on the 29th anniversary of her arrest on the Birmingham bus. She was once again arrested,
this time outside the South African embassy for protesting the apartheid system.244 Reporter
Chuck Stone, observing the news from Philadelphia, remarked that the FSAM provided the antiapartheid movement with “more political oxygen”; it could now raise a “prairie fire.” In saying
so, Stone deliberately co-opted a popular conservative metaphor that used to describe Reagan’s
ability to rally conservatives behind his policies.245
The Reagan administration’s immediate concern was on maintaining the course for its
economic policy and supporting the South African government to salvage its public appearance.
Fourie publicly compared the FSAM sit-ins to the siege of the American embassy during the Iran
hostage crisis of 1979. 246 Reagan officials quickly tried to reassure Fourie. The FSAM
participants were simply “the administration’s enemies.” Chester Crocker reaffirmed that
constructive engagement was sufficient pressure to prompt change in South Africa, especially in
light of the recent successes of regional negotiations. 247 With the de-escalation of tension along
the border of Namibia and Angola and the initial SADF troop removal in one of the Angolan
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hot-zones, Ondjiva, Crocker argued that the United States’ current relationship with South Africa
was productive in the peace-making process.248
The US Mission to the UN further defended gradual reform by extending scholarships to
Black South African students to study in the United States. 249 The increase in admission of Black
South African students in American universities promoted a shared goal in investing in Black
South African education and the principle of self-help. This investment in Black South African
education, the administration argued, was in direct opposition to the Divestment Movement’s
effort to remove US support completely from South Africa.250 In emphasizing Black education
endeavors after 1984, the Reagan administration presented itself as an ally compared to the
Divestment Movement’s economically radical agenda would only harm Black South Africans.
Further rejecting the pressure from the FSAM, State Department memos emphasized the
need to oversee gradual evolutionary change and to minimize the influence of anti-apartheid
organizations with communist ties, like the ANC.251 On the international stage, the United States
Mission to the UN placed doubts on the “high-minded pronouncements” and aspirations of
outside observers and the Divestment Movement to gather more international support for
economic gradualism.252 The administration attempted to defend its stance on evolutionary
change to certain Black resistance leaders not affiliated with the ANC. For example, Archbishop
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Desmond Tutu met with Reagan for the first and only time on December 7th; the meeting
garnered little goodwill between the two. Reagan’s diary entry after the meeting referred to Tutu
as naïve and unaware of the “considerable progress with [the United States’] quiet diplomacy.”253
Just mere weeks after the FSAM sit-ins, Reagan resolutely ignored the changing winds and
renewed his commitment to constructive engagement as the sole policy regarding South Africa
to the most prominent public Black South African resistance leader.
In managing the concerns on Capitol Hill following the FSAM sit-ins, Reagan’s Africa
team faced yet another lobbying battle with anti-apartheid organizers. TransAfrica and its FSAM
branch organized a list of demands and shared protest tactics with its remote chapter members
outside of D.C. Setting up remote branches across the US and capitalizing on the local antiapartheid efforts, TransAfrica promoted similar sit-ins at South African consulates in many
major cities.254 Eventually becoming a “Who’s who of American civil rights,” the FSAM brought
together internationally known celebrities like Harry Belafonte, Stevie Wonder, and tennis star
Arthur Ashe, as well as local activists and city officials, all behind a same cause, the end of the
apartheid system. These national figures of FSAM amplified the political strain on local
officials.255 This local pressure translated once again into pressure on Capitol Hill as Congress
continued to discuss sanction legislation. Letter writing campaigns targeted moderate
Republicans, asking them to support House sponsored bills like H.R. 1460.256 Senator Edward
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Kennedy (D-MA) followed the House’s own action with his own bipartisan-supported bill, S.
635. The bill included much of the House’s bill on import/export restrictions and prohibited new
corporate investment in South Africa.257
The Reagan administration and South African lobbyists criticized these bills that they
deemed them harmful to the reform process in South Africa. South Africa, quick to preserve a
stable economic relationship with the Unite States, spent over USD$1 million in pursuing new
conservative lobbyists, especially those tied to the far-right and the emerging “New Right,” to
carry out a message of gradual reform.258 Both South Africa and the Reagan administration used
Black conservative figures and lobbyists, like North Carolina businessman William Keyes as a
member of the South African funded International Public Affairs Consultants, Inc. to convey
their message.259 Conservative think-tanks like the Heritage Foundation continued to support
constructive engagement. They accused the Divestment Campaign of depicting a skewed image
of Afrikanerdom and of ignoring the complex details of peacemaking. Heritage Foundation
researcher Stuart Butler stated that complete divestment would only make hardline Afrikaners
more stubborn against reform and force them to turn to other anti-communist allies, like France
or Israel, for economic support should the US divest.260 Conservative news outlets acted as an
echo chamber for the Reagan administration. William Buckley Jr.’s Firing Line frequently
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hosted South African allies who opposed divestment leaders to gather support for the Reagan
administration.261
The South African government sponsored South African Foundation trips for
conservative congressional members. During these trips, congressional members toured South
African businesses and relayed the message that divestment or sanctions was harmful to Black
South Africans.262 Anti-apartheid organizations were quick to attack the South African
Foundation as “an apologist organization” that carefully curated a favorable image of South
Africa on these congressional visits.263 Pretoria fostered similar conversations between South
African corporations with non-affiliated US businesses. John C. Hall, a senior executive at the
South African industrial management corporation Barlow Rand, sent over thirty letters to US
corporations urging them to support constructive engagement. Hall argued that apartheid was
“slowly but surely being dismantled,” but cautioned business executives against the quick pace
of revolution that would end the “hopes of peaceful existence.” 264 This yet again mirrored the
continued Botha’s administration’s messaging of gradual reform led by the apartheid
government. Reagan and South African officials’ appeals were insufficient to counter the
growing anti-apartheid demands of the American people.
News coverage of the rising anti-apartheid message made Reagan staffers’ task of
maintaining economic gradualism with South Africa difficult. US ambassador to South Africa
Herman Nickel commented on this rising tide of anti-apartheid messaging alongside the news
coverage of state violence. In an interview with the Time, he stated “that images of repression
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will always blot the more complicated story of reform.”265 American reporters frequently
questioned the feasibility of Reagan’s continued course of action for gradualism. New York
Times reporter Bernard Gwertzman claimed the administration had difficulties making its
opposition to apartheid “credible” against public demands for sanctions while the Black
townships continue to face state-sponsored violence.266 A New York Times writer noted that the
current movement on the Hill was indicative that “Americans [were] no longer accept[ing]
the…pieties called ‘constructive engagement.’”267 Growing discontent equally came from the
business community tired of the rhetoric and political upheaval. A few key South African
businesses shifted their views and called for the ANC ban repealed to encourage reform.268
Barlow Rand’s CEO, Mike Rosholt, accused Botha of shuffling his feet towards reform.269 By the
late summer of 1984, the Botha regime felt pressure from the ever-growing opposition from all
directions: the anti-apartheid apparatus, Washington, and now its own business community.
Even the Reagan administration recognized the pressure growing from its own
conservative allies on the Hill. While Reagan defended South Africa against the legislative
sanctions, he also wrote to Botha in September 1985 advising him to take bold initiatives to open
dialogue with Black leaders in South Africa.270 Conscious that apartheid currently “occupied the
attention of the American public as never before,” Reagan argued that opening the dialogue
would keep criticism of the current United States-South African relationship at bay.271
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The ‘New Manifesto’ and Public Management of Anti-Apartheid Sentiment
Anti-apartheid organizations used their economic argument against the Reagan
administration to demand change in the current South African policy. South Africa, a state in
internal turmoil, recognized that the standard policy justification for its gradualist reform—on
the basis of anti-communism defense against rising Marxist neighbors—was no longer a
justifiable position for the larger international community. Just like Ronald Reagan’s team, the
South African government was aware of the perception and optics of its public decision-making.
Botha’s response to these demands for reform, however, was unexpected to the Reagan
administration and energizing to the anti-apartheid apparatus.
On August 15, 1985 President Botha addressed 2,500 people at the National Party Natal
Congress opening in Durban, South Africa. Over 200 million others watched worldwide as
Botha outlined and defended his “manifesto for a new South Africa.”272 Everyone, including
members of Botha’s own cabinet, expected an outline of progressive reforms. Yet, Botha
professed to the world that to “destroy White South Africa and [its] influence” would lead the
country into “faction strife, chaos, and poverty.” 273 Botha dug his heels further and defended the
apartheid regime. He accused outside observers like the United States of being out of touch to
the reality in South Africa.274 Botha, in his view, believed Mandela promoted violence instead of
a true reform process.
Liberal South African critics of the administration argued that Botha’s speech “widen[ed]
the gap in perception” between South Africa’s allies, its critics, and the true intention of the
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Botha regime on what reforms were necessary to improve race relations in South Africa.275
Alister Sparks of the Washington Post wrote on liberal Afrikaners own confusion over the
conflicting statements from Foreign Minister Pik Botha on South Africa’s willingness to
withdrawal from Namibia. Yet, President P. W. Botha’s speech—meant to outline the
forthcoming legislative agenda for the year—had no mention of peaceful negotiations with
FLS.276 An Afrikaner History Professor at the University of Cape Town, Hermann Giliomee
described Botha’s speech as “an attempt by the Afrikaners to find the secret of sharing power
without losing control” in the face of growing liberal Afrikaner domestic pressure.277 The press
dubbed Botha’s speech as the “Rubicon speech” and Afrikaners’ last stand to racial change.
Botha, with invoking the historical metaphor, attempted to capitalize on the Afrikaner national
pride by asserting its control over the country and its people. Botha proclaimed to be “crossing
the Rubicon” on a new South Africa, based entirely on of white-led change, where his
government was unwilling to balk at reform demands. The speech sent shock waves through the
United States and allies.
Struggling to understand the dramatic shift from Pretoria, Reagan officials shared the
immediate US reaction of supporting continued and open negotiations between all relevant
parties, except communist-influences groups like the ANC. While aware of growing talks on
Capitol Hill for sanctions, McFarlane and his deputy John Poindexter discussed with the State
Department on how to best seize the public’s attention on sanctions in light of Botha’s speech.
According to historian Robert Massie, it was in response to the public backlash that the National
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Security Council and the Africa team met to create the list of sanctions that would be a part of
Ronald Reagan’s upcoming Executive Order 12532. 278 Executive Order 12532 became the first
executive sanction leveled against South Africa since 1960. Publicly, McFarlane’s statement
called on Botha to clarify his language while reiterating the United States’ support for ongoing
negotiations between all relevant parties in South Africa.279 The day after the Rubicon Speech,
Chester Crocker argued that constructive engagement was the only productive policy with South
Africa. Crocker did, however, state that the release of Mandela and removal of influx control—
the passbooks and the Orderly Movement Bills—were critical to the US to support, as these
measures would be definitive evidence of Botha’s willingness to reform. In attempting to
downplay Botha’s fiery speech, Crocker argued that the “Rubicon” for South Africa was not the
possibility of apartheid ending itself as it would bound to take place, but how and when these
pivotal reforms would begin.280
Botha’s Rubicon speech did little to garner sympathy from Americans. Rather, Botha’s
fevered speech emboldened the anti-apartheid activists’ desire for sanctions and aggravated
legislative tension in Washington, D.C. According to a secret NSC memo, the Reagan
administration anticipated that “the speech [would] do little to quiet domestic and international
criticism.”281 Following their own criticism South Africa’s state of emergency declared in July,
anti-apartheid activists continued their demands of Black citizenship as a necessary reform to
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ease tensions in South Africa. Without reform, the racist policies would continue and so would
resistance.282
The continued pressure from anti-apartheid activists in September 1985 echoed the
seventy-seven percent of Black South African workers who also supported US sanctions against
the South African government.283 United States corporations, in response to this pressure,
followed suit almost immediately. Within weeks of Botha’s Rubicon speech, some US banks
withdrew over $4.1 billion from South Africa. Washington Post reporter Erin MacLellan
observed the move as indicative of protecting US business interest against the ongoing political
unrest in South Africa. However, many banks only temporary halted their trade with South
Africa. CitiCorp and Morgan Guaranty stipulated that they would resume business with the
South African government once genuine progress for the “political, economic, and social
conditions” improvement of all races too place.284 With the shifting business interest in the
United States and growing support of anti-apartheid activists, the Reagan administration
responded in an effort to quell criticism.
Reagan’s NSC followed the model of National Security Decision Directive 77 to
maintain a favorable image of the President’s foreign policy. Internal memos claimed that the
most important element of the NSC’s South African diplomacy was an “appropriate US public
stance” on apartheid as it was “a vital element in selling [its] policy both domestically and
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internationally.”285 On September 7, 1985, Reagan began his fully committed efforts to public
policy targeted South Africa specifically with the new NSDD 187. The SPG’s role specific to
South Africa included promoting US businesses investing in Black South African development
and limiting “the imposition of new legislative sanctions against South Africa.”286 The US
embassy in South Africa, however, reported growing discontent about the United States’ inaction
against increased economic pressure.287 This inaction made it difficult to “sell [the United
States’] message,” as Black South Africans increasingly viewed constructive engagement as a
policy “overloaded with carrots” over substantive pressure to reform.288
With harsher congressional action in the pipeline, the Reagan administration
preemptively sought to craft an executive-led economic policy on South Africa. On September 9,
1985, Reagan announced the rollout of Executive Order 12532. Reagan’s original speech at the
signing of EO 12532 admitted that, “after much soul-searching,” the administration was taking
hardline action “against the machinery of apartheid” to economically dissociate the US from
apartheid.289 The phrase “soul-searching” never made it to the final draft; instead, Reagan
claimed that he would implement these sanctions in an effort to “develop a bipartisan basis of
consensus,” on US policy towards South Africa.290 Yet, later in the speech, Reagan claimed that
US policy towards South Africa could only come in carefully structured terms to maintain
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peace.291 Reagan’s team was quick to state that the executive order was not a shift from
constructive engagement. Instead, it was a continuation of a longstanding measure to pressure
reform of apartheid.292
The executive order offered a moderate level of sanctions against the South African
government. Included in EO 12532 was a ban on computer sales, non-health related nuclear
commerce, and South African arms.293 The executive order’s sanctions allowed Cabinet level
officials, including the Treasury Secretary, to make exceptions to certain South African trading
partners and maintain large scale economic engagements. To distance the administration from a
hotly contested and coined phrase, the Reagan administration did not use the terms ‘Sullivan
Principles,’ but “fair labor principles.”294 This distinction in semantics had significant
enforcement consequences. No longer were the Principles guiding the US Treasury and State
Department’s regulation of permitted US businesses working with South Africa.
By eliminating a “cumbersome new bureaucracy obstacle, the State and Treasury
Departments no longer had to check corporate regulations of Sullivan Principle signatories.295 In
hindsight, the response from the Reagan administration was not unexpected—for even while
Reagan supported the Principles, the principles were seldom enforced. Further evidence that
Reagan did not intent to implement massive economic pressure was that the executive order
lacked any indication that future sanctions would be implemented should Pretoria fail to improve
labor standards.
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The preemptive nature of the EO against mounting congressional reactions paralleled
Reagan’s earlier economic defense of South African engagement in the 1982 Congressional
hearings. Similar to the justification for continued ARMSCOR equipment trades in 1982, Reagan
officials crafted an early administrative messaging campaign on the basis of economics and anticommunists sentiments. Many reporters assumed that the executive order was an effort to save
the President from “the possible embarrassment” of bending to congressional will on a foreign
policy matter.296 Reagan’s South Africa policy began and continued to be a policy justifying the
United States’ relationship with South Africa on the grounds of national security and economic
interests of Cold War. Yet, when anti-apartheid organizations gained national attention from
their own anti-apartheid economic rhetoric, US public demands for change in South Africa
emerged. Once the well-established support for Reagan fell with the rapid decline of support
from US corporations, the Reagan White House changed its diplomacy with South Africa and
slightly shifted its economic message with EO 12532’s minimal sanctions against South Africa.

Reactions to Executive Order 12532
The immediate response to EO 12532 by anti-apartheid activists with their continued
pressure on Capitol Hill and South Africa’s gradual reforms, fostered yet another political
argument over sanctions against Pretoria. Instead of promoting large-scale sanctions that he felt
would harm the people of South Africa, Reagan asserted the need for continued United States
“active engagement” with Pretoria.297 The Christian Science Monitor reporter Charlotte
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Saikowski claimed that the executive order indicated the administration continuing practice of
“quiet diplomacy” through constructive engagement.298
While Senate Majority leader Bob Dole commended the President for his actions, several
moderate Republicans warned against remaining economically friendly with South Africa.299
Jerry Falwell, a prominent conservative Christian televangelist, engendered this shift in the
majority of conservatives when he featured Senator Helms on his nightly Falwell Live show in
defense of the executive order. Falwell and Helms reframed the sanctions argument in
“communism versus freedom” terms and encouraged viewers to support Pretoria’s efforts to
censor so called communist Black South Africans for the sake of South Africa’s national
security. In tying all Black resistance leaders to communism, Falwell and Helms falsely painted
Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, as communism to attack the antiapartheid movement.300 This red-baiting led seventeen Republicans to speak out against Falwell’s
continued attempts to discredit Tutu as a communist sympathizer, incapable of negotiating with
the Pretoria government.301 These Republicans further claimed that Falwell and Helms’ rhetoric
cloaked apartheid in “the robe of Christianity” as defenders against alleged communist leaders
and was an abomination to Christian values of human rights.302
Members of Congress frequently used economics and morality to support their different
positions on South African sanctions. Moderate Republicans and center Democrats claimed that
the executive order was “chock-full of loopholes” and fell short of putting effective economic
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pressure on the apartheid regime.303 Despite the administration’s effort to stall the sanctions
debate on the Hill, some Congress members were unsatisfied with Reagan’s preemptive
response. Republican Senate Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Richard Lugar
described the executive order as only a “second-best solution” compared to bipartisan bills that
implemented sanctions against Pretoria.304 Previous bipartisan support for sanctions in an August
1985 bill—H.R. 1460—created a House-Senate joint Conference report that called for an
expansion of sanctions against South Africa.305
In defense of the Reagan administration, far-right conservatives in the Senate worked
with Reagan staffers to limit the support for H.R. 1460. Senator Helms and Dole tabled all
discussions on H.R. 1460 with a filibuster to allow Reagan to sign EO 12532 into force. 306
Chester Crocker’s later recollections confirmed that EO 12532 was a preemptive motion to limit
Congressional control and input over the sanctions debate. In recognizing the growing support
for H.R. 1460, Reagan’s Executive Order 12532 allowed the foreign policy apparatus to select
the bill’s most tolerable elements while “scrap[ing] the less acceptable parts.”307
Anti-apartheid lobbyists described Reagan’s executive order as a policy out of touch
policy with the hardships in South Africa. Citing the order as a “coup” on foreign policy,
TransAfrica urged its members to continue their pressure on elected officials, local and
national.308 Lobbyists at the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) used their close relationship
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with the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and other congressional leaders to advocate for
increased sanctions against South Africa.309 The WOA accused Reagan of usurping legislative
power to create weaker sanctions against Pretoria while also using loopholes, like the Treasury’s
discretion on trading partners, to continue economic engagement with the country.310 This
bottom-up pressure from anti-apartheid leaders who pushed Congress to reconsider the bipartisan
sanctions recommendations per H.R. 1460.
Historian Rasmus Søndergaard argues that the executive order was the White House’s
adapting to the “chang[ing] political reality.”311 Anti-apartheid activists’ efforts shaped this new
political reality where the previously shrugged off economics sanctions, became the expected
policy with South Africa. Following EO 12532, anti-apartheid activists continued to criticize
Reagan for the weak executive action on sanctions. In attempting to limit action from Congress,
the Reagan White House elevated the Pretoria sanctions debate to national attention with EO
12532. Despite the nightly coverage of the Free South Africa Movement consistent picketing of
the South African embassy and consulates in the United States, in August 1985 fifty-eight
percent of Americans had little to no knowledge of the apartheid situation.312 Soon after the
announcement of EO 12532, the American people spoke about sanctions against apartheid over
the dinner tables and in the workplace. American Committee on Africa’s research writer,
William Minter, argued that the executive order as the first time that the sanctions debate entered
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“mainstream US politics.”313 According to Crocker, this discussion on sanctions in the American
home increased the pressure for both progress in South African reform and regional peace
negotiations.
The anti-apartheid agenda for sanctions overcame the Reagan administration’s economic
gradualism in popularity. The executive order, a moderate sanction legislation, reflected the
growing demands from Congress and anti-apartheid organizations for the administration to do
more to influence change in South Africa than the policy of constructive engagement. Chapter
Five follows the final years of the Reagan administration and their efforts to control their
relationship with South Africa—using regional peace accords and ongoing dialogue with Black
leaders in South Africa as evidence towards progress. These steps toward progress were,
however, done only in defense against anti-apartheid criticism and only after years of continued
friendly relations with the apartheid government.
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CHAPTER 5
DELIBERATE REFRAMING OF US POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 1985DECEMBER 1988
Introduction
Reagan’s final years in office came with various foreign and domestic policy struggles.
Aside from the Divestment Movement, the Iran-Contra Affair dominated news headlines and
American attention. Developing diplomatic efforts with Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union
continued to improve Reagan’s anti-communist image, while easing tensions with the
superpower.314 At the Washington and Moscow Summits of 1987 and 1988, Reagan and
Gorbachev’s efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation encouraged more cooperative deescalation.315 Domestically, Reagan addressed the AIDS epidemic that he largely ignored in his
first term while the US stock market saw improved gains.316 Larger international aid efforts,
including HIV/AIDS relief and famine aid, raised public awareness about the African continent.
Anti-apartheid activists used the language of anti-communism and support for international
aid—to raise awareness about sanctions against Pretoria.
Following marginal economic pressures imposed by Reagan’s Executive Order 12532,
the debate over sanctions made the national headlines.317 Reagan’s administration attempted to
quell public criticism with a public campaign to curate and protect the image of the US-South
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Africa relationship. The National Security Council (NSC) established the South African Working
Group to foster collaboration between the administration, pro-democratic organizations, and
conservative foundations. The South African Working Group worked to counter the “negative
western media coverage” that criticized the administration.318 Yet, the efforts of the South
African Working Group failed to effectively curb anti-apartheid sentiments across the United
States or to maintain limited sanctions on Capitol Hill.

Public Diplomacy Maneuvering
As Americans in the mid-1980s “discovered the existence of apartheid,” the Reagan
administration prioritized public opinion over policy on the sanctions debate.319 Reagan officials
like Crocker believed that the recent American awareness of the reality of the South African
humanitarian concerns was because “black opposition… found the organizational means to
mobilize an effective movement of resistance” against the policy of constructive engagement.320
Crocker characterized the sanctions debate as political theater and detracted from the substantive
work of the State Department. Yet State Department officials relied on news outlets to bring the
policy of constructive engagement to the American people to curb the growing power of antiapartheid organizations’ influence foreign policy criticism.
State Department officials used newspaper columns, radio stations, and television
network as instruments to improve the Department’s public image. Crocker himself frequented
public broadcasting shows to defend constructive engagement as a dual policy of internal change
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and regional peace building. In a MacNeil/Lehrer PBS NewsHour interview, Crocker claimed
that incremental reduction of South Africa’s aggression in Namibia was evidence enough of
constructive engagement’s success. He later defended he executive order as an important step in
clarifying the administration’s policy of constructive engagement without destabilizing the South
Africa economy.321
This public media campaign extended beyond American-based media outlets. US
ambassador Herman Nickel maintained frequent public appearances on the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and gave interviews to both Afrikaner and Black newspapers
as a means to influence the perception of South Africans on US policies.322 Reflecting antiapartheid demands for power-sharing between white and Black South Africans, Crocker urged
the State Department to engage with the Black community in South Africa. The State
Department allocated funding to outreach programs in existing embassies to focus on Black
community development. In addition to furthering the administration’s conservative principle of
self-help, these outreach programs included the partnering of American firms with Black presses
to promote the Sullivan Principles, assisting Black-owned South African businesses with small
foreign aid packages, and expanding the State Department’s privately funded Operation
Crossroads Africa (OCA) scholarship program to any South African students. These outreach
programs served to strengthen the United States’ “credibility as a catalyst for peaceful
change.”323 These efforts attempted to reframe United States’ involvement in South Africa away
from the strategic resources, anti-communist justification. ORA was meant to emphasize
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Reagan’s long-term investment in the South African people. As such, the State Department
continued to promote economics as the means of monitoring change in Pretoria. The intended
effect was twofold: increasing public awareness of non-sanction alternatives and improving
public relations with Black South African leaders.
The officials of the NSC established the South African Working Group under National
Security Decision Directive 187 in early September 1985. 324 The South African Working Group
included Crocker and his State Department assistants, NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane, members
of USIA, as well as several US ambassadors to FLS. At the first meeting of the Working Group,
held fifteen days after the executive order, they assigned various tasks and goals to its different
members. White House Cabinet Secretary Al Kingon requested that all cabinet secretaries give
speeches related to South African diplomacy within the next four months to ensure positive
administration-wide support for continued engagement with South Africa. US Ambassador to
Zimbabwe Dave Miller worked through the President’s Office of Public Liaison to set up several
favorable interviews with Reagan staffers over the next several months to encourage continued
US economic engagement. Vice President George H. W. Bush facilitated further public support
for economic engagement in several press meetings with Sullivan Principles signatory
companies.325
These projects of South African Working Group indicate a massive bureaucratic effort to
carefully preserve Reagan’s policy gradualism reform against rising public criticism. The
Working Group’s comprehensive efforts worked to insulate current US policy against the
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political whims of popular support. One of The South African Working Group’s goals was to
create enough favorable media campaigns to quell the anti-apartheid perspective on the air
waves. The South African Working Group best epitomizes the Reagan administration’s efforts to
improve the domestic messaging of constructive engagement as a viable policy over increased
sanctions on Pretoria.
Meanwhile, anti-apartheid activists continued to use television and public campaigns to
spread their oppositional message. The WOA echoed the sentiments of Bishop Tutu in saying
that Reagan’s recommendation to engage Black leaders was “too little, too late.”326 By December
1985, the South African police killed over 850 township protesters.327 Television journalism
brought images of apartheid rule into the homes of Americans with increasing coverage from
September 1985 through 1986 as awareness of aid efforts in the African continent expanded.328 In
January 1985, dozens of celebrities recorded the popular song “We are the World” as an effort to
raise funds to help famine-stricken Ethiopia. Similarly, in July, the “Live Aid” fundraising
concert featured headlining rock stars spreading news about the issue. With over $100 million
raised worldwide, “Live Aid” and “We are the World” gave rise to a new role of Americans who
used their dollar to advocate for change in US foreign policy.329 New York Times journalist John
Corry observed that television’s increased coverage of humanitarian crises and violence on the
African continent informed America’s own growth in advocacy for international aid and
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reform.330 This growth of advocacy matched the local efforts of Divestment Movement chapters
which pressured the US home offices of companies operating in South Africa to divest.
The Reagan staffers’ efforts to curb divestment talk and support US business in South
Africa also included encouraging the conservative practices from private businesses. In late
1985, nearly eighty US corporations, including General Motors, Fluor Corporation, and Mobil
Corporation formed the United States Corporate Council on South Africa. 331 As an independent
business organization, the US Corporate Council on South Africa’s hoped to promote the
Sullivan Principles as the only economically viable reform of apartheid. However, private
memos between Chester Crocker and George Shultz speak of the administration’s
encouragement to form of the US Corporate Council. The US Corporate Council worked to
ensure private business support of Reagan’s minimal sanctions with South Africa and corporate
resistance to divestment.332 In Selling Apartheid: South Africa’s Global Propaganda War,
journalist Ron Nixon argued that the NSC urged Sullivan Principles signatories, like those of the
US Corporate Council, to resist divestment talks.333
Several anti-apartheid leaders criticized the Corporate Council’s delayed and weak
position in Pretoria. Jennifer Davis, the Executive Director for the ACOA, said that “there’s a
crisis in South Africa, and there isn’t any time left for [these companies] to carry out their very
carefully paced programs” of reform.334 TransAfrica director Randall Robinson, in a special
interview with The Black Scholar, recalled the local efforts for divestment in cities and states.
Robinson credited local efforts as evidence of an inevitable change where “pressure [was
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applied] on those corporations [still involved with South Africa] to accelerate their departure.”335
With the new focus of US sanctions on “the specific objectives and at what pace,” Robinson
outlined the next steps for the anti-apartheid activists was implementing more economic pressure
on Pretoria.336
News coverage inundated the US population with image of violence against resistance
groups in South African townships. The South African Institute of Race Relations conducted a
study in 1985 and claimed that violence in South Africa was in response to the “unprecedently
levels of intensity” from Black resistance.337 This heightened resistance in South Africa was part
of the larger plan by Black South Africans to organize massive resistance within the townships
and overwhelm the security apparatus. By doing so, Black South Africans would “the townships
ungovernable… and apartheid unworkable everywhere.”338 Exiled African National Congress
President Oliver Tambo outlined this Black resistance goal to show Americans and the rest of
Pretoria’s allies the inherent violence of the apartheid system.
The increased media attention on the unrest coupled with the local activities of antiapartheid activists criticizing Reagan were ultimately successful at rising American awareness to
the problems in being in supporting a regime. In a November 1985 CBS poll, 44% of
respondents called for the Reagan administration to do more besides Executive Order 12532.
Another 45% of those surveyed called for US corporations to leave South Africa, up ten percent
from an earlier summer survey.339 Recognizing the growing support for harsher punishment
against South Africa, a number of conservative congresspeople turned against the President to
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maintain their constituents’ support. This opened the door for moderate Republicans to work
with the Democrats on the Hill on sanctions against South Africa.

Revitalization of Anti-Communist Policy Defense
In conjunction with domestic media campaigns, the State Department and the National
Security Council reengaged with the Frontline States (FLS) to improve US diplomatic
appearances and mend their relationship. While Crocker and Shultz felt more confident in this
secondary focus of constructive engagement, they continued to promote economic-based
diplomacy for peaceful transitions. First in this regional peacebuilding approach, Crocker
focused on the transportation industry, as FLS relied heavily on South African infrastructure for
rail support and goods shipments.340 The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), for example, worked alongside United States Information Agency to allocate $15
million to improve the rail and road infrastructure and to develop alternative transportation
routes away from townships with prevalent Black South African unrest.341 This strategically
placed aid paralleled the Reagan Doctrine’s empowerment of anti-communist fighters under the
guise of facilitating humanitarian reform; it ultimately limited the ability of Black resistance
leaders to organize unrest campaigns with the FLS. By minimizing potential unrest, Pretoria
could reduce its presence in the townships and prevent a certain amount of negative media
coverage of the state-perpetrated violence.
The conservative’s successful repeal of the Clark amendment in October 1985 further
emboldened this façade of humanitarian policies. State Department memos expressed hope that
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the Clark amendment repeal would facilitate a “pro-Western armed resistance,” in Angola with
supporting covert military operations by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) forces.342 The Reagan administration then used the repeal of the Clark amendment to
further its regional peacebuilding approach on the grounds of anti-communist support. With the
repeal, Reagan could then allow financial support to anti-communist fighters, like UNITA, while
maintaining economic engagement with UNITA’s primary support—Pretoria. CIA analysts
predicted that the repeal of the Clark amendment opened favorable avenues of regional
negotiations for Reagan’s team. These avenues included financially supporting Jonas Savimbi
and UNITA and supplying US weaponry to UNITA against the communist-allied People's
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in territory skirmishes.343 State Department
officials continued to advocate for regionalism with South Africa and anti-communist allies as a
means to limit the communist influence in the region.
The larger context of the repeal of the Clark amendment was the attempt to fit southern
Africa into the Reagan Doctrine. The Reagan Doctrine outlined Reagan’s commitment to
reinvigorate US involvement in anti-communist fighting worldwide. 344 In Reagan’s 1985 State
of the Union address, he declared that the US was willing to provide overt and covert aid to
rollback communist influence across the world.345 Congress’ repeal of the Clark amendment
according to Republican Minnesota Representative Vin Weber, instilled the “Reagan doctrine in
the Congress.” 346 Despite South Africa’s own controversial human rights record, the anti-
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communist ally and its allied-UNITA forces received military aid and support to fight against
communist forces. This reframed US’ role in southern Africa in simplistic terms of anticommunism rather than the intricacies of constructive engagement’s management of internal
reform and multiple parties in negotiations.
However, southern Africa did not clearly fit the Reagan doctrine mold. South Africa was
a capitalist state but a humanitarian pariah. Crocker himself admitted that the region did not fit
the easy model that Secretary Shultz advocated for in the summer of 1985 where “it must always
be clear whose side [the United States] is on.” 347 The Reagan administration still imposed some
form of sanctions against South Africa while the United States’ aided Pretoria-allied forces in
Angola. In allying with South Africa and UNITA, the State Department isolated Angolan and
Namibian parties in the regional negotiations. Yet, rejecting South Africa might also isolate
UNITA group operating in Angola as the only anti-communist forces. For that reason, the
Reagan administration could not escape addressing its relationship with South Africa—even in
the regionalism approach.

1986: The “Path of Peaceful, Constructive Change”
In early January 1986, Reagan urged South African President Botha to reform for the
sake of ensuring continued regional de-escalation of tensions. Reagan suggested that Botha
seized the “political initiative” so that his administration and the American business community
could “play a more constructive role.”348 Reagan wrote to Botha stating that he was looking
forward to providing US aid in “propelling [his] country forward on the path of peaceful,
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constructive change,” in January 1986. 349 However, the White House and the majority of
Congress diverged on what constituted as change. Representative Ronald Dellums, as major
leader in the Congressional Black Caucus, and moderate Republican Senate leadership of Nancy
Kassebaum and Richard Lugar led the way for more aggressive sanctions in 1986 with the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.
Following the announcement of Executive Order 12532, Democrats investigated the
impact of increased sanctions on South Africa with a renewed interest on reconsidering
legislation related to the tabled H.R. 1460. House Democrats held hearings on the impact of
divestment to investigate the potential results from increased economic pressure.350 In these
hearings, the new executive director of the Washington Office, Jean Sindab, spoke at length
about divestment’s negligible impact on the US economy. Using the example of the city
government of Washington D.C.’s recent divestment of pension funds from their South African
holdings, Sindab emphasized divestment’s “no measurable impact” on D.C. city employees or
the maintenance of the city’s pension system. Sindab’s example furthered TransAfrica’s message
that divesting did not harm the individual American wanting to pressure change in South Africa
through economic means.351
Yet if divestment had a minimal impact on the US economy, it was a powerful tool
against the apartheid system. A testimony from Audrey Smock of the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility highlighted that the divestment of US Corporate Council members
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from South Africa would create a massive “economic vulnerability,” in the apartheid system.352
The US Corporate Council’s full withdrawal could leave Pretoria without the economic means to
continue state violence.
The Congressional review did not end with these September 1985 testimonies. In 1986,
Representative Ronald Dellums (CA) paved the way for a congressional reform to constructive
engagement. A longstanding supporter of the anti-apartheid movement, Dellums capitalized on
the increased public demands in and outside of Washington to go further than Reagan’s
executive order. In a House debate in May 1986, Dellums proposed an amendment that would
prohibit US companies from trading with the South African government. Dellums’ amendment
passed by a voice vote and the revised House legislation—what became the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act— was passed in June 1986. There was, however, little expectation that
Senate would pass the bill.353
Escalation of violence in South Africa and the pressure from the White House did,
however, encourage moderate Republicans to carefully reevaluate the possibility of further
sanctions in the next legislative term. Over the legislative break, South Africa further tightened
its security apparatus as June 1986 marked the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Uprisings. To
limit the ceremonies marking the anniversary, South African President Botha declared a national
state of emergency and arrested over 1,000 people protesting the restrictions. This was done
under the guise of quelling communist resistance, but Botha even admitted that Pretoria was well
aware that the “stricter security action [would] elicit strong criticism and even punitive measures
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from the outside world.” 354 While Crocker defended the Reagan administration’s active
involvement “across the political spectrum in South Africa during this difficult period,” the
administration did not implement further sanctions against Pretoria.355 In response, House of
Representatives African Subcommittee Chairman Howard Wolpe (D-MI) asserted that Crocker’s
efforts to engage with South Africa continually failed to abide state-sanctioned violence and
political bans.356 The increased violence and subsequent Congressional criticism set back the
efforts by the South African Working Group of the NSC, whose members had planned on
“building and mobilizing a group of informed, moderate supporters of [the] administration’s
policy.”357
US State Department officials suggested a speech from Reagan to publicly reassure
European allies, FLS, and Congress that progress in both regional peace negotiations and
apartheid reform continued. The speech strategically came prior the Senate’s September meeting
on sanctions. Just like EO 12532, Reagan staffers wanted to control the message that increased
sanctions were an ill-advised tool that only “add[ed] to the trauma and exacerbate polarization in
South Africa and the region” and to admit that the executive order was ineffective.358 However,
unlike EO 12532, Reagan’s July 1986 speech did little to reduce the “emotional clamor” on the
Hill and the call for increased sanctions.359
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Further evidence of the administration’s attempt to improve public appearance of reform
came in leadership changes. In the same speech, Reagan announced that the first Black American
ambassador to the Republic—North Carolina businessman Edward Perkins—would replace
Herman Nickel. Reagan stated the change in ambassador “symbolize[d the] American
commitments to the black people of South Africa and encourage[d] black-white negotiation.”360
Steven Roberts of the New York Times claimed that Perkins’ appointment served to win Senate
support against sanctions legislation.361
With Reagan’s refusal to impose more sanctions during the unrest of the summer of
1986, Crocker claimed that President, the “great communicator,” had become “the great
polarizer.” 362 New York Times reporter Bernard Weinraub observed that “no other speech in the
Reagan Presidency [had] stirred as much internal opposition and bipartisan criticism.”363
Congresspeople sensed that Reagan’s speech failed to adequately address the continued violence
in South Africa or effectively pressuring Pretoria for power-sharing reforms. The conservative
opposition to Reagan’s inactions came primarily from Republican Senators Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on Africa Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) and
Richard Lugar (R-IN), whose states frequently hosted anti-apartheid activist divestment efforts.
Anti-apartheid organizations worked alongside the Senate’s consideration of H.R. 4868
with a summer of mass activism hoping to secure enough votes to pass the bill. The ACOA
created a National Anti-Apartheid Strategy in early June to place resources and organizers at key
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battleground states and pressure its senators.364 Through mailing and phone-in campaigns, the
ACOA members called moderate Republicans and Democratic senators to support Dellums’
H.R. 4868.365 In Kansas, ACOA member Prexy Nesbitt and trade unionist Nomonde Ngubo led
the way to pressure Kassebaum in supporting H.R. 4868. As Chairwoman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on Africa, Kassebaum’s vote in support of the bill would encourage
moderate Republicans to support the legislation as well. Over the summer, Nesbitt visited more
than forty different Kansas venues and met with organizers at churches, campuses, and public
spaces to build “constituent support and relationships of pressure” on their senators—Kassebaum
and Dole.366 Pressure on the Hill was obvious as local constituencies mobilized across the
country for sanctions. Television stations offered near constant news coverage on sanctions
legislation with Reagan official “defending and explaining US policy five times in ten days,” to
fight the local efforts by anti-apartheid activists.367
In September 1986, alongside public pressures in key states, the Senate continued to
investigate the feasibility of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid. During Nesbitt and Ngubo’s
Kansas tour, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Richard Lugar held
hearings on sanctions legislation. Robinson drew the Senate’s attention to the seventy-seven
percent of urban-dwelling Black South Africans who supported comprehensive sanctions—
refuting the longstanding message of the administration that claimed that urban Black workers
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did not support sanctions.368 Following Senator Joseph Biden’s (D-DE) critique of Reagan’s
weak statement on increased state sanction violence, Shultz resorted to the familiar anticommunist rhetoric of supporting the Afrikaners government’s right to limit ANC communist
fighters in their borders and ignoring the largely unprovoked attacks on non-ANC affiliate Black
South Africans.369 Yet it is only after a ten-day visit to the African continent in early September,
including a visit of the FLS, Mozambique, and Botswana, that Chairwoman of the Senate
African subcommittee, Nancy Kassebaum “abandoned her support” of constructive
engagement—effectively abandoning Crocker.370 The final vote on the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act came on September 12th; the legislation passed by 308-77 in the House and 84-14
in Senate. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was then sent to Reagan to decide on whether
to sign the legislation and allow Congress to dictate the economic terms of engagement with
South Africa, or to veto it in hope that moderate Republicans would not succumb to antiapartheid activist pressure and override the veto.
The State Department advocated for Reagan to veto H.R. 4868. Crocker recommended
another executive order that would include some of the sanctions put forth by the Act in
particular a ban on iron and steel imports from Pretoria.371 Another potential executive order, like
that of EO 12532, would allow Reagan’s State Department to dictate the terms of US
engagement in South Africa—not Congress.
Reagan vetoed H.R. 4868 and immediately the White House was ill-prepared to maintain
his veto. Several conflicting lobbying strategies created a disorganized effort from the Reagan
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White House to maintain the veto. Far-right advocates like Central Intelligence Agency Director
William Casey and Communications Director Pat Buchanan met with far-right senators to
promote their claims that increased sanctions would limit the effectiveness of the United States’
Cold War policies worldwide. Potentially losing an ally in southern Africa could be considered
by international leaders as a failure of US rollback policies against communism.372 Reagan, in a
similar fashion, issued a statement with his veto stating that the House was attempting to engage
in “economic warfare against the people of South Africa.”373 Reagan staffers launched a media
campaigns to avoid a congressional veto override. Within the NSC, the South Africa Working
Group attempted to build a defense of Reagan’s veto and statement with continued newspaper
articles and public appearances. Director of White House Public Liaison Marl Maseng asked for
lobbying support from the Working Group in working with the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty. The White House Public Liaison additionally bought ad space in The
Washington Times supporting Reagan’s veto.374 This internal disorder split the Republican party
position on sanctions with South Africa.
While Congress continued the debate Reagan’s veto in September 1986, anti-apartheid
activists in Congress and outside worked to secure the two-thirds require to override Reagan’s
veto. Dellums told to his Republican colleague, Mark Soljander (MI), that even the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act’s overwhelming House democratic support “placed pressure
on the United States Senate” in the lead up to the 1986 midterm elections. This pressure,
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Dellums later reflected, forced moderate Republicans to be on the public record about sanctions
against apartheid.375 Archbishop Tutu, from the confines of his house arrest in Cape Town,
released the following statement targeting the United States President:
The man who has applied sanctions against Poland, Nicaragua and Libya at the drop of a
hat refuses steadfastly to take any effective action against one of the most vicious policies
the world has known… Apartheid will be dismantled and its victims will remember those
who helped to destroy this evil system. And President Reagan will be judged harshly by
history.376
Reagan’s last-ditch attempt came four days after Tutu’s statement with two brief and identical
letters to Republican Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Democratic Speaker of the House
Thomas O’Neill. In them, Reagan repeated his earlier statement on a new executive order and
promised a multiyear aid program to the region to avoid economic sanctions.377 Nonetheless, the
House voted overwhelming to override Reagan’s veto, 313-83, and sent the bill to the Senate for
a final vote as the 1986 midterm elections neared.378
The Senate remained the final legislative body in the decision on sanctions. In a speech at
the University of Arkansas, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar said that
Congress’ failure to override Reagan’s veto “would be seen as support for the South African
government’s policies.”379 Reagan was not the only political leader attempting to influence
decision-making in the Senate. South African foreign minister Pik Botha called North Carolina
Senator Jesse Helms, a notable ally in opposing sanctions, and two senators Chuck Grassley (R-
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IA) and Democrat Edward Zorinsky (D-NE), two days prior to the Senate vote.380 As prominent
Midwesterner Senators, Grassley and Zorinsky played an important role as more moderate
Senators whose vote influenced others on the fringe. Pik Botha threatened to end South African
purchases of US grain shipments—primarily supplied by midwestern states—if the veto was not
sustained.381 Following the phone call that Lugar equated to “bribery and intimidation,” both
Grassley and Zorinsky sided with seventy-six other senators to override the veto on
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, with a 78-21 vote.382 ACOA members, upon reflecting on
the passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, observed that “by the end of the summer,
the intense nationwide lobbying campaign [had] generated an atmosphere in which a vote against
sanctions was a vote for apartheid.”383 Only for the second time in US history had Congress
overridden a presidential veto on foreign policy matters. The other veto overrode the Vietnamera War Powers Act of 1973 which severely limited the President’s ability to initiate military
action abroad.384
Law Professor Winston Nagan called passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
a sign that the critics of Reagan saw constructive engagement as “more or less a label designed
to package and sell the legitimacy of white supremacy.”385 Beyond the political embarrassment of
the veto override, the American voters further checked Reagan’s policies at the ballot box as
news of the Iran-Contra scandal broke only days before the midterms. The 1986 congressional
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midterms resulted in the Democrats gaining the majority in the Senate and keeping control of the
House.386
With a Democrat-controlled Congress, the Reagan Africa team was further forced to shift
its foreign policy with South Africa. Chester Crocker expressed his own frustration—calling the
veto override an “Iran-Contra in microcosm,”—where the debate over sanctions detracted from
the supposed original two-pronged goal of constructive engagement of regional peace and
internal reform.387 Reagan, however, attempted to maintain control over US policy by stating that
while his administration would implement the new law, the law would “not solve the serious
problems that plague[d]” South Africa.388 Because of anti-apartheid pressure on Congress and the
White House, the dual policy of constructive engagement was now changing.

Selectively Implementing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
Congress’s new regulations, however, did not equate to overnight policy changes by the Reagan
administration. Following the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the State,
Treasury, and Commerce departments implemented sanctions as they saw fit.389 A secret memo
from Nicholas Platt of the NSC to the Commerce Department encouraged all executive
departments to stall the implementation of Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Platt stated that
the delay would be the result of regulating business trading of strategic minerals “essential for
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the economy and defense of the United States.”390 This gave Reagan the flexibility to implement
the Act within his parameters and under his control.
The Treasury Department’s first deliberate delay in implementing the sanctions was in
the case of the uranium trade.391 This was in direct response to the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act’s section 309 that outright prohibited any importation of uranium from South
Africa.392 The Treasury Department interpreted the regulation as only banning the importation of
raw uranium, and not of other, still usable, uranium compounds. This meant the Treasury
Department did not include other usable uranium oxides, like uranium hexafluoride—necessary
for the creation of uranium-235 in fueling nuclear power plants—on the prohibited imports
regulations. This allowed the US to maintain a uranium trading relationship with South Africa—
despite the prohibition per the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid—and to contribute to the large
mining industry in South Africa that disproportionately underpaid Black workers.393
In response, Democratic leaders like Howard Wolpe, Ron Dellums, and Ted Kennedy on
the Hill wrote that the language in section 309 included all forms of South African uranium, as
approved by their Republican counterparts.394 This infraction on the uranium ban continued
through 1987. The WOA accused the Reagan administration of subverting Congress’s authority
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and of “weakening some of the stronger provisions of the bill.”395 Another Democrat, Bill
Richardson from New Mexico, called the Treasury Department’s actions as a “game of loophole
hide and seek.”396 This selective uranium ban contradicted to the larger Cold War dialogue
between the United States and Soviet Union, as both superpowers worked on the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces treaty discussions to cease the production of conventional ground
launched nuclear missiles.397 Reagan staffers justified continuing to import uranium hexafluoride
as necessary to maintain current nuclear reactors within the United States.398
Dellums, with the aid of the anti-apartheid organization Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, lead the litigation over Reagan’s slow enforcement of section 309 to its full
extent. In 1987, the Lawyers’ Committee filed several injunctions against the Treasury
Department and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to block the uranium imports to no
avail. The NRC and Treasury Department denied the requests, claiming that uranium played an
essential role in national security.399 Dellums and several other anti-apartheid supporters—
including Randall Robinson of TransAfrica—argued that the NRC’s failure to implement a
complete uranium prohibition “blunted the effectiveness of the Anti-Apartheid Act.”400 In his
opinion on Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1988), circuit judge Laurence
Silberman stated that the courts could not rule on “congressional predictions as to the
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effectiveness of the legislation”—thus allowing Reagan to continue his selective
implementation.401 By October 1987, the Department of Energy reported that twenty-eight
percent of the United States’ uranium hexafluoride supply came from South African or from
occupied-Namibian mines.402 The sheer defiance of Reagan’s Treasury department to fully
implement a complete uranium prohibition provided one example of the larger unwillingness of
the administration to shift their policy towards South Africa.

Salvaging an Appearance of Change and Avoiding Public Surrender
The State Department and NSC recalibrated the US policy to engage with Black
resistance leaders and FLS representatives to pressure Pretoria in participating in regional
peacebuilding. Despite this engagement with Black leaders, the administration attempted to
maintain a conservative-led reform in the region. Several Reagan supporters and officials, in the
first-year review of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, claimed that the Act was ineffective
because it weakened US influence over the region and stifled regional peace negotiations.
William Pascoe from the conservative leaning think tank Heritage Foundation reported to
Congress that “when dealing with the Afrikaners, the carrot works better than the stick,” while
providing no substantial evidence or statistical data to support his claims.403 Crocker used more
overt language on reporting the effectiveness of Act to Congress. He criticized Congress for
bending to popular demands from the “broadest and loudest” in the public debate on sanctions in
1986. Crocker asserted that the public debate and critics of the Reagan administration severely
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undercut US foreign policy and its “influence over South African government.”404 Despite the
supposed lack of influence, Crocker then carefully outlined that South Africa’s response to the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act—foreign press expulsion, increased security in Black
townships, and stalled negotiations for the release of Nelson Mandela—made it difficult for the
State Department to maintain open channels between the Black leadership and the apartheid
government. After all, the United States wanted to be “builders, not destroyers,” of potential
reforms in South Africa.405 This newfound encouragement of Black-Afrikaner dialogue was a
calculated position and hastened policy creation by the Reagan administration following the
National Party’s refusal to meet with Reagan officials.
Afrikaner officials distanced themselves from the United States which further hurt
Reagan’s public image on US foreign policy. For instance, Pik Botha and Chester Crocker did
not meet for over two years despite multiple efforts by Crocker. By then, public pressure on both
Crocker and the Botha regime was apparent. Neil Lewis’ June 1987 New York Times column
denounced Crocker’s constructive engagement as a complete failure in reforming apartheid or in
bringing peace to Namibia and the Angolan border.406 The continued scrutiny over constructive
engagement forced Crocker to explore different diplomatic tactics in response to South Africa’s
increased political arrests, including that of Nobel Peace Prize recipient Archbishop Desmond
Tutu in March 1987.407
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The NSC observed the growing tide of anti-apartheid sentiment within both South Africa
and the US and sought ways to subtlety shift its policy. This NSC policy focused on more
palatable strategies, including expanding US engagement with the Black South African
leadership. The National Security Decision Directive 273 issued in May 1987 capitalized on the
new opportunities derived from the sanctions. By using the Anti-Apartheid Act to convey a new
“affirmation of American commitment to South Africa’s disenfranchised citizens,” the NSC
advocated for FLS to ease its’ own sanctions against the South African government in effort to
restart regional negotiations.408 The NSC’s new policy expanded the number of approved antiapartheid South African leaders, including the ANC’s Oliver Tambo, to meet with State
Department officials and help reinvigorate diplomatic communications beyond the National
Party.409 Further engagement with Black leadership came with Crocker’s deputy assistant, Chas
Freeman, Jr. urging of scholarship funds from Congress for Black South African students to
“help them develop the skills to fight apartheid peacefully,” within the apartheid system.410
State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost described
Secretary Shultz’s earlier January meeting with exiled Africa National Congress President Oliver
Tambo as the opening of a dialogue between the United States and Black South Africans.411
Shultz was equally outspoken about the need with for the ANC to cut ties with the Communist
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Party to further deescalate regional tensions.”412 This meeting reflected a larger trend in Cold
War diplomacy as Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev engaged in nuclear deescalation and arms control negotiations.413 In both the Washington and Moscow Summits,
Reagan and Gorbachev discussed southern Africa and the curbing of Soviet monetary support for
People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).414 This gradual easing of tension with
the Soviets reflected Reagan officials’ willingness to meet with the ANC, an organization still
economically supported by the Soviets. Reagan officials with ANC members, per anonymous
State Department officials, was meant to “defuse criticism of American policy by Black leaders”
within the United States.415 Crocker recalled the importance of the Shultz-Tambo meeting in
overcoming the “saga of 1986,” and the sanctions debate.416
The administration’s continued appeal for Nelson Mandela’s release also spoke to the
growing acceptance of Black leadership in South Africa as Mandela was the most predominant
political prisoner under the apartheid system. On July 18, 1988, the day of Mandela’s 70th
birthday, Reagan’s Assistant to the President for Press Relations, Marlin Fitzwater, called for his
release. Fitzwater argued that this gesture would create an environment favorable to further
negotiations for democracy in South Africa.417
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Frantic to preserve some credibility of constructive engagement, Crocker met again with
Savimbi’s UNITA officials to reaffirm a positive relationship with the South African-supported
militia group. Crocker’s meeting with the Soviet-supported MPLA and FLS representatives
allowed his team to bridge between opposing parties on regional peace. The MPLA and FLS
meeting in Brazzaville, Congo April 1987 provided a crucial foundation for what became known
as the Tripartite Agreement. In Brazzaville, Crocker and newly appointed NSC African director,
Hank Cohen, met with Angola’s MPLA Interior Minister Manuel A. “Kito” Rodrigues for the
first time in fourteen months. Rodrigues agreed to persuade MPLA forces to re-engage with the
US and change their troop placement on the Angola-South Africa border in exchange for
Pretoria’s willingness to meet over the course of several planning meetings.
From April 1987 to December 1988, Crocker and the rest of the Reagan administration
remained focused on quickening the timetable to resolve the Angolan-South African tension and
Namibian. Crocker organized meetings between the two parties—MPLA and UNITA—and
gradually brought in more external parties, including the Organization of African Unity, the
Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Africa.418 Despite maintaining the policy of linkage, where South
African troop withdrawal from Namibia depended on Cuban withdrawal from Angola, far-right
congresspeople frequently criticized the State Department’s tactics. Jesse Helms argued that
Crocker was a “tepid, tardy supporter” who was not doing enough to support UNITA fighting
campaigns following the appeal of the Clark amendment.419 Similarly, Democrats criticized
Reagan’s Africa team for their late re-engagement with FLS leaders.
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Crocker worked with both sides of the negotiating table to simply maintain a crosscommunication during the final months of the administration.420 From May through early
December 1988, Crocker traveled to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, Pik
Botha, and UNITA and MPLA leaders in different European cities and FLS capitals.421 The May
meeting with Adamishin set up the final stages of negotiations between all parties. The ensuing
US press coverage suddenly favored the public plans for peace and credited Crocker as its
architect. Reporters like New York Times John Battersby called for optimism in September 1988
as peace talks “advanced significantly.”422 South Africans re-engaged in regional talks solely
from a self-interest motivation. The continued sanctions against Pretoria had severely weakened
the domestic reputation of the National Party in upcoming elections against liberal white South
African parties.423 Afrikaner diplomats like Pik Botha spoke to President P. W. Botha on the
benefit of meeting with Angolan and Cuban representatives to secure legitimacy as a regional
power.424 The National Party believed that by re-engaging in regional talks they could preserve
their control in Parliament. In late December 1988, Crocker brought together South Africa,
Cuba, and Angola to sign the Tripartite Agreement that outlined timetables for South Africa’s
troop withdrawal from Namibia and allow for independent elections by 1989. A separate
bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola, signed at the same time, arranged for Cuban
troop withdrawal and served as a confidence-building measure for South Africa in the Tripartite
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Agreement.425 The ongoing media coverage of the event praised Crocker for his ability to broker
the linkage policy between conflicting states and his fresh approach to engaging with South
Africa in the first place.426 Michael McFaul of Stanford University’s Center for International
Security and Arms Control credited Crocker’s new thinking and style of diplomacy for the
Tripartite Agreement.427 From there, the Reagan administration was well-placed to claim victory
in southern Africa as Vice President George H. W. Bush secured the Presidency in the 1988
election.428
The State Department’s deliberate refocusing on regionalism over internal reform played
a significant role in crafting a positive image of Reagan’s relationship with South Africa in the
late stages of his presidency. Crocker successfully overcame the foreign policy embarrassment
after the veto override of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Mainstream network and press
coverage portrayed Crocker’s role in finally resolving a peaceful enforcement of United Nations
Resolution 435, as his “Holy Grail” of diplomacy.429
Anti-apartheid activists’ response to the Tripartite Agreement largely fell outside the US
media coverage. Both the WOA and Africa Fund urged mailing list members to continue to
challenge Reagan’s policies of South Africa. Despite its participation in the Tripartite
Agreement, South Africa still politically imprisoned thousands and refused to extend political
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representation to Black South Africans.430 Only a single New York Times editorial shared the
anti-apartheid sentiment and called attention to the unfinished second-prong of constructive
engagement: internal apartheid reform. In the editorial, the writer notes Crocker’s well-deserved
accomplishments in regionalism for bringing South Africa to the negotiation table with Angola
and Cuba. However, they also highlight that “the Reagan Administration has failed to alleviate
the poisons of apartheid.”431 As the primary task of constructive engagement, facilitating
democratic change in South Africa was still an unfinished task for the United States.

Over the final three years of the administration, Reagan officials took deliberate steps to
influence the public’s opinion on South Africa. Dedicated bureaucratic staffers within the NSC
and State Department worked with public organizations to build favorability on the Hill and
combat the rising growth of the anti-apartheid movement. Yet the administration never once
recognized the power of the anti-apartheid movement to pressure Reagan’s change in policies
towards regionalism. Even Crocker’s own recollection of the motivations on Executive Order
12532 and resulting focus towards regionalism gave little credence to who pressured the policy
shift. Crocker’s only overt reference to the anti-apartheid organizers was with the Free South
Africa Movement in November 1984 and the “degree of partisan poison injected into the
debate.”432
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
What began as a US Cold War alliance vested solely in the anti-communist rhetoric and loose
criticism of the apartheid system transformed into a carefully negotiation of regional
peacebuilding and economic sanctions against the apartheid state. Reagan officials took credit
for resolving regional peace negotiations and improving the everyday life of Black South African
over the course of eight years. Ronald Reagan left office with the political roadmap to transition
South Africa to democracy in the 1990s.433 Yet anti-apartheid activists’ pressure to apply
economic sanctions decisively influenced the reform of US policies towards Pretoria. This thesis
focused on the extent to which Reagan officials maintained their gradualist policy of constructive
engagement over addressing the economic policy demands by Congress and nontraditional
foreign policy actors.
This thesis explored the subtle effect that nontraditional foreign policy actors had in
influencing the creation, implementation, and revisions of Reagan’s foreign policy regarding
South Africa and the southern African region. Media personalities, political leaders in Congress,
and anti-apartheid activists worldwide played a critical role in molding the perception of the
United States-South African relationship. Reagan’s relationship with South Africa was a
complex, multifaceted dynamic where the public played a direct role in policy construction and
execution. This increased US public attention informed how the Reagan administration engaged
with South Africa.
Anti-apartheid activists initially struggled to change the Reagan administration’s policies.
Chapter Two, covering the 1980 election and early months of Reagan’s first term, focused
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primarily on the early anti-apartheid efforts to stop the resurgence of anti-communist
conservativism in foreign policy thinking. The subsequent chapters then discuss how public
influences—especially anti-apartheid groups—over Reagan’s policies towards South Africa both
educated the American public on the issue of apartheid and mobilized strategic campaigns in
Congress, in localities, and in the press to criticize the policy of constructive engagement.
Chapter Three, from October 1981 through 1983, analyzed how Reagan cultivated open,
economically-friendly relations with South Africa. Reagan’s control over the South African
policy was justified through strategic minerals and resources sales of an anti-communist ally.
Chapter Four examined how rising anti-apartheid activism brought increasing public awareness
of South African state violence to cultivate criticism against the constructive engagement as a
failing policy of the Reagan administration. Anti-apartheid activists curated the public perception
based on both humanitarian and economic concerns to build support for sanctions and
divestment. The Reagan administration crafted EO 12532’s weaker sanctions against South
Africa to combat the growing criticism by anti-apartheid activists both in the media and on
Capitol Hill and limit any possible reviews toward the evidence of constructive engagement
shortcomings
Chapter Five’s coverage of the the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act debates and the
quickened resolve for the Tripartite Agreement relies on the final three years of Reagan’s tenure
as attempts to salvage the public perception of their relationship with South Africa while
minimizing the impact of anti-apartheid activists on policy shifts. Throughout the eight years of
Reagan’s tenure, his staffers and Department officials took careful considerations on how the US
positioned itself on apartheid reform through the language of gradualism and weaker economic
pressures.
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The extent of nontraditional foreign policy actors’ influence over an administration’s
policy remains an important study in the field of foreign relations.434 In the current era of US
involvement in other strategically significant areas of the world, non-governmental organizations
and popular movements produce international discourse over questions of equity. The Summer
2020 Black Lives Matter international protests—following the deaths of George Floyd, Breanna
Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery— are the most recent example of US popular movements on
international issues of race equity and the justice system.435 Several anti-apartheid activists,
observing the Summer 2020 protests, spoke to the power of social media and virial videos as
crucial components to rising public awareness and gathering support for their agenda, similar to
that of the US news coverage of the township unrest and unprovoked violence on Black South
Africans.436 While the anti-apartheid movement achieved its primary goal of bringing an end to
apartheid, many organizers, like ACOA researcher William Minter, lamented the loss of media
and national attention towards their larger goals of addressing African inequity following the
release of Nelson Mandela.437 As a result, these discussions over equity remain and the 1980s
anti-apartheid movement’s influence provides a crucial case study into the power of
nontraditional foreign policy actors as agents of change. Pressuring a US President to apply
sanctions on strategic ally like South Africa and securing a presidential veto override are foreign

Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for
US Foreign Policy?” World Politics 64, no. 3 (July 2012): 555-585; Craig Hayden, “Logics of narrative and
networks in US public diplomacy: Communication power and US strategic engagement,” The Journal of
International Communication 19, no. 2 (2013). Goldsmith and Horiuchi provide a focus on outside of the US
political groups that coordinate with US-based groups whereas Hayden pays particular attention to US-based
advocacy groups on both foreign and domestic policies.
435
Mary Dudziak, “George Floyd Moves the World: The Legacy of Racial Protest in America and the Imperative of
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policy achievements that few nontraditional foreign policy actors have achieved. Anti-apartheid
organizations and activists used collective messaging and pressure through media, protest, and
congressional lobbying to criticize and shift Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy of constructive
engagement. From the 1980 campaign through the Tripartite Agreement of December 1988, the
active battle over the US-South African relationship and its public perception between Reagan
staffers and its opponents. Reagan never admitted to the role of non-traditional foreign policy
actors had in the evolution of his South African policy.
Further study into the role of nontraditional foreign policy actors in different foreign
policy areas would allow scholars to understand how Reagan addressed different interest groups.
Recent work on churches and religious organizations push this field in a new direction. The
study of religious influences over Reagan’s foreign policy facilitates a larger conversation about
humanitarian concerns in foreign policy and how different organizations address them.438
Additional studies on how strategic relationships with foreign powers were relayed to the US
public and how their framing differs when discussing US allies versus less friendly nations could
be of equal value to the field. This thesis analyzed how from 1980 through 1988 several antiapartheid organizations, leaders, and politicians used the public arena to debate US policies to
advance their agenda. In an age where public debates take place in both physical and virtual
spaces, studying the history of how different groups use these platforms is ultimately the key to
grappling with the current influences on US foreign policy.

Lauren Turek’s To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Relations (2020) provides a recent example on the role of evangelical Christian organizations in foreign
policy matters while advocating for the Religious Rights’ positions abroad.
438
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